Category: Oregon Real Estate Law

  • CoreLogic: 11.1 Million U.S. Properties with Negative Equity in Q4, Calculatedriskblog.com


    CoreLogic released the Q4 2011 negative equity report today.

    CoreLogic … today released negative equity data showing that 11.1 million, or 22.8 percent, of all residential properties with a mortgage were in negative equity at the end of the fourth quarter of 2011. This is up from 10.7 million properties, 22.1 percent, in the third quarter of 2011. An additional 2.5 million borrowers had less than five percent equity, referred to as near-negative equity, in the fourth quarter. Together, negative equity and near-negative equity mortgages accounted for 27.8 percent of all residential properties with a mortgage nationwide in the fourth quarter, up from 27.1 in the previous quarter. Nationally, the total mortgage debt outstanding on properties in negative equity increased from $2.7 trillion in the third quarter to $2.8 trillion in the fourth quarter.

    “Due to the seasonal declines in home prices and slowing foreclosure pipeline which is depressing home prices, the negative equity share rose in late 2011. The negative equity share is back to the same level as Q3 2009, which is when we began reporting negative equity using this methodology. The high level of negative equity and the inability to pay is the ‘double trigger’ of default, and the reason we have such a significant foreclosure pipeline. While the economic recovery will reduce the propensity of the inability to pay trigger, negative equity will take an extended period of time to improve, and if there is a hiccup in the economic recovery, it could mean a rise in foreclosures.” said Mark Fleming, chief economist with CoreLogic.

    Here are a couple of graphs from the report:

    CoreLogic, Negative Equity by StateClick on graph for larger image.

    This graph shows the break down of negative equity by state. Note: Data not available for some states. From CoreLogic:

    Nevada had the highest negative equity percentage with 61 percent of all of its mortgaged properties underwater, followed by Arizona (48 percent), Florida (44 percent), Michigan (35 percent) and Georgia (33 percent). This is the second consecutive quarter that Georgia was in the top five, surpassing California (29 percent) which previously had been in the top five since tracking began in 2009. The top five states combined have an average negative equity share of 44.3 percent, while the remaining states have a combined average negative equity share of 15.3 percent.”

    CoreLogic, Distribution of EquityThe second graph shows the distribution of equity by state- black is Loan-to-value (LTV) of less than 80%, blue is 80% to 100%, red is a LTV of greater than 100% (or negative equity). Note: This only includes homeowners with a mortgage – about 31% of homeowners nationwide do not have a mortgage.

    Some states – like New York – have a large percentage of borrowers with more than 20% equity, and Nevada, Arizona and Florida have the fewest borrowers with more than 20% equity.

    Some interesting data on borrowers with and without home equity loans from CoreLogic: “Of the 11.1 million upside-down borrowers, there are 6.7 million first liens without home equity loans. This group of borrowers has an average mortgage balance of $219,000 and is underwater by an average of $51,000 or an LTV ratio of 130 percent.

    The remaining 4.4 million upside-down borrowers had both first and second liens. Their average mortgage balance was $306,000 and they were upside down by an average of $84,000 or a combined LTV of 138 percent.”

     

  • Financial Force Majeure


    Financial Force Majeure: The Virtual World Taylored to Our Real World

    If any of you have ever played the virtual reality game, Sim City or any similar, you will probably appreciate the point to be made more immediately than those unfamiliar. For the unfamiliar, this is a game in which you are the master of the land, tasked with taking what amounts to any empty field and building, expanding, and developing yourself a thriving metropolis.

    This entails tapping into the natural resources that are available within your splotch of land, thereby harnessing those resources to grow your community. As master of your domain, you have to the politician, the banker, the shopkeeper too, making wise decisions with your electronic currency inasmuch as budgeting and investment are concerned. You have to provide the infrastructure, exploiting what resources you have to attract more Sims (the inhabitants of your city) to further grow your town.

    You zone the land for residential, commercial, and industrial zones and providing for greenbelt, park, and recreational zones. You build schools, banks, retail and shopping centers, single-family and multi-family residential, industrial, and hospitals. As in the real world, this is done through various types of investment deals in the both the private and public sectors, involving commercial and investment banks, private investors and businesses. Your metropolis’ success depends on good investment strategies.

    Mother Nature is an ever present threat, just as in the real world, throwing a natural disaster your way now and again. Of course, disaster strikes when least expected, testing the validity of your decisions, most of all your infrastructure. It is than you discover if value engineering the levy walls was such a good idea. Should news of cutting corners for costs leaks out, it costs your city, as restitution to flood victims is yours to bear.

    Of course, the entirety is based on a designed program consisting of a language, codes, and locks. As with any program there savvy programmers, some might say hackers, having the learned knowledge to manipulate codes, language, and changing locks or even to remove locks. Purposes in hacking games might be to expand the games capabilities or to be able to be able to skip ahead to more advanced levels without having to play through the levels not desired.

    Virtual reality games are rooted in fantasy, even if based on real situations, there is no tangible result. Emotional personal satisfaction or perhaps of monetary award if in some sort of competition is the best reward one can hope for. You can’t physically walk the streets of your city, go to one of its schools, or benefit from the investment dividends in terms of attaining real dollars.

    For the developers, the tangible aspects are realized by sales which return in real dollars to the owners of the rights to the game. The developers might not necessarily be the owners either, depending on whether the developers retain rights or assigned them away to another.

    The point to take away from this little piece is more of a question. What if, with highly sophisticated programming, it was possible to design investment strategies, for instance and than somehow apply them to the real world? What if it has already been done…..What if our whole entire economy has been modeled in the virtual world, brought forth into the real world?

    Sound ridiculous? ………think again…….

     

    INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEM FOR SEAMLESS VIRTUAL TO REAL WORLD OPERATIONS      

    US Patent Pub. No.: US 2002/0188760 Al

     

    SECURING CONTRACTS IN A VIRTUAL WORLD    

    US Patent Pub. No.: US 2007/0117615

     

    WEB DEPENDENT CONSUMER FINANCING AND VIRTUAL RESELLING METHOD      

    US Patent Pub. No.: US 2001/0056399 A1

     

    TRANSACTIONS IN VIRTUAL PROPERTY      

    US Patent Pub. No.: US 2005/0021472 Al

     

    VIRTUAL FINANCE/INSURANCE COMPANY       

    US Patent Pub. No.: US 2003/0187768 A1

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

  • Prototype of Standardized Monthly Mortgage Statement is Released, by Jim Puzzanghera, Los Angeles Times


    The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau‘s proposed statement is designed to provide clear information about the loan on a single page and wouldn’t change each time your loan is sold to a new servicer.

     

     

    Reporting from Washington—

    Your monthly mortgage bill soon could get easier to understand, and it wouldn’t change each time your loan is sold to a new servicer.

    The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has developed a proposed standardized mortgage servicer statement designed to provide clear information about the loan on a single page.

    The prototype released Monday included a breakdown of how much of the monthly payment went to principal, interest and escrow. The form also detailed the outstanding principal, maturity date, prepayment penalty and, for adjustable-rate mortgages, the time when the interest rate could change.

    “This information will help consumers stay on top of their mortgage costs and hold their mortgage servicers accountable for fixing errors that crop up,” said Richard Cordray, the agency’s director. “Given the widespread mortgage servicing problems we’ve seen over the past few years, consumers need clear disclosures they can count on.”

    Although many servicers already provide such information on their monthly statements, there are no industrywide standards, the agency said.

    Such standards are a good idea, and initial reaction from servicers to the agency’s proposal was positive, said Rod J. Alba, senior counsel in the mortgage markets division at the American Bankers Assn.

    The agency posted a working draft of the standardized statement on its website,http://www.consumerfinance.gov to solicit input from the public and industry before a version of the form formally is proposed this summer.

    Ed Mierzwinski, consumer program director for the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, said simplified mortgage statements would help resolve the broad mortgage servicing problems that were at the heart of last week’s federal and state settlement with five of the nation’s largest banks over botched foreclosure paperwork.

    The consumer agency is required under the 2010 financial reform law to put new mortgage servicing rules in place to help consumers, Cordray said. The law has specific requirements for mortgage statements, including a phone number and email address for the customer to get information about the loan, as well as information about housing counselors.

    The new mortgage statement is the latest consumer financial paperwork the agency is trying to simplify.

    In May, it released two prototypes for shorter, easier-to-understand disclosure forms that lenders would have to give home buyers before they close on a mortgage. The agency has been receiving comments on the forms and tested them last month in Philadelphia.

    And in December, the agency proposed a simplified credit card agreement form to make it easier to understand interest rate terms and comparison shop.

    The agency also is developing a new disclosure rule for hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages that would require consumers to be notified months before their first interest rate increase, as well as to be provided with a good-faith estimate of the new monthly payment.

    jim.puzzanghera@latimes.com

  • Fannie, Freddie overhaul unlikely, by Vicki Needham, Thehill.com


    An overhaul of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is unlikely again this year despite recent Republican efforts to move the issue up the agenda.

    Congressional Republicans, along with some Democrats — and even GOP presidential candidate Newt Gingrich — are renewing calls to craft an agreement to reduce the involvement of Fannie and Freddie in the nation’s mortgage market.

    But without a broader accord, passage of any legislation this year is slim, housing experts say.

     

    Jim Tobin, senior vice president of government affairs for the National Association of Home Builders, concedes that despite a mix of Democratic and Republican proposals, including a push by the Obama administration last year, congressional leaders probably won’t get far this year on a plan for Fannie and Freddie, the government-controlled mortgage giants.

     

    Tobin said there are “good ideas out there” and while he expects the House to put some bills on the floor and possibly pass legislation, the Senate is likely to remain in oversight mode without any “broad-based legislation on housing finance.”

    “We’re bracing for a year where it’s difficult to break through on important policy issues,” he said this week.

    While the issue makes for a good talking point, especially in an presidential election year, congressional efforts are largely being stymied by the housing market’s sluggish recovery, prohibiting the hand off between the government and private sector in mortgage financing, housing experts say.

    David Crowe, chief economist with NAHB, said that the market has hit rock bottom and is now undergoing a “slow climb out of the hole.”

    The House has taken the biggest steps so far — by mid-July the Financial Services Committee had approved 14 bills intended to jump-start reform of the government-sponsored enterprises.

    “As we continue to move immediate reforms, our ultimate goal remains, to end the bailout of Fannie, Freddie and build a stronger housing finance system that no longer relies on government guarantees,” panel Chairman Spencer Bachus (R-Ala.) said last summer.

    Meanwhile, a number of GOP and bipartisan measures have emerged — Democrats and Republicans generally agree Fannie and Freddie are in need of a fix but their ideas still widely vary.

    There are a handful of bills floating around Congress, including one by Reps. John Campbell (R-Calif.) and Gary Peters (D-Mich.), and another by Reps. Gary Miller (R-Calif.) and Carolyn Maloney (D-N.Y), which would wind down Fannie and Freddie and create a new system of privately financed organizations to support the mortgage market.

    “Every one of those approaches replaces them [Fannie and Freddie] with what they think is the best alternative to having a new system going forward that would really fix the problem and would really give certainty to the marketplace and allow housing finance to come back, and therefore housing to come back, as well,” Campbell said at a markup last month.

    There’s another bill by Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas) and bills in the Senate being pushed by Sens. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.).

    Corker, a member of the Senate Banking Committee, made the case earlier this week for unwinding government support for the GSEs while promoting his 10-year plan that would put in place the “infrastructure for the private sector to step in behind it.”

    “A big part of the problem right now is the private sector is on strike,” Corker said.

    He has argued that his bill isn’t a silver bullet, rather a conversation starter to accelerate talks.

    “So what we need to do is figure out an orderly wind-down,” Corker said in November. “And so we’ve been working on this for some time. We know that Fannie and Freddie cannot exist in the future.”

    He suggested getting the federal government this year to gradually wind down the amount of the loans it guarantees from 90 percent to 80 percent and then to 70 percent.

    “And as that drops down, we think the market will send signals as to what the difference in price is between what the government is actually guaranteeing and what they’re not,” he said.

    Even Gingrich, who has taken heat for his involvement with taking money while doing consulting work for the GSEs, called for an unwinding during a December interview.

    “I do, in fact, favor breaking both of them up,” he said on CBS’ Face the Nation. “I’ve said each of them should devolve into probably four or five companies. And they should be weaned off of the government endorsements, because it has given them both inappropriate advantages and because we now know from the history of how they evolved, that they abused that kind of responsibility.”

    In a white paper on housing last week, the Federal Reserve argued that the mortgage giants should take a more active role in boosting the housing market, although they didn’t outline suggestions for how to fix the agencies.

    The central bank did argue that “some actions that cause greater losses to be sustained by the GSEs in the near term might be in the interest of taxpayers to pursue if those actions result in a quicker and more vigorous economic recovery.”

    Nearly a year ago, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner asked Congress to approve legislation overhauling Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac within two years — that deadline appears to be in jeopardy.

    The Obama administration’s initial recommendations called for inviting private dollars to crowd out government support for home loans. The white paper released in February proposed three options for the nation’s housing market after Fannie and Freddie are wound down, with varying roles for the government to play.

    About the same time last year, Bachus made ending the “taxpayer-funded bailout of Fannie and Freddie” the panel’s first priority.

    While an overhaul remains stalled for now there is plenty of other activity on several fronts.

    In November, the Financial Services panel overwhelmingly approved a measure to stop future bonuses and suspend the current multi-million dollar compensation packages for the top executives at the agencies.

    The top executives came under fire for providing the bonuses but argued they need to do something to attract the talent necessary to oversee  $5 trillion in mortgage assets.

    Earlier this month, the Federal Housing Finance Agency announced that the head of Fannie received $5.6 million in compensation and the chief executive of Freddie received $5.4 million.

    Under the bill, the top executives of Fannie and Freddie could only have earned $218,978 this year.

    Last week, Fannie’s chief executive Michael Williams announced he would step down from his position once a successor is found. That comes only three months after Freddie’s CEO Charles Haldeman Jr. announced that he will leave his post this year.

    The government is being tasked to find replacements, not only for the two mortgage giants which have cost taxpayers more than $150 billion since their government takeover in 2008, but there is talk that the Obama administration is looking to replace FHFA acting director Edward DeMarco, the overseer of the GSEs.

    In a letter to President Obama earlier this week, more than two dozen House members said DeMarco simply hasn’t done enough to help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure.

    The lawmakers are pushing the president to name a permanent director “immediately.”

    Also, in December, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued six former executives at Fannie and Freddie, alleging they misled the public and investors about the amount of risky mortgages in their portfolio.

    In the claims, the SEC contends that as the housing bubble began to burst, the executives suggested to investors that the GSEs were not substantially exposed to sub-prime mortgages that were defaulting across the country.

  • There Is No Bubble and Even if There Is It’s Not a Problem, by Economist’s View Blog


    The big story today seems to be the Fed’s comments about the housing bubble in transcripts from their meetings in 2006. The transcripts show what we already knew, that the Fed was never fully convinced there was a housing bubble, and asserted that even if there was the dmage could be contained — they could easily clean up after it pops without the economy suffering too much damage:

    Greenspan image tarnished by newly released documents, by Zachary A. Goldfarb, Washington Post: The leaders of the Federal Reserve went around the room saluting Alan Greenspan during his last major meeting as chairman of the central bank Jan. 31, 2006. …

    Some six years later, Greenspan’s record — sterling when he left the central bank after 18 years — looks much more mixed. Many economists and analysts say a range of Fed policies contributed to the financial crisis and resulting recession. These included keeping interest rates low for an extended period, failing to take action to stem the bubble in housing prices and inadequate oversight of financial firms.

    The Thursday release of transcripts of Fed meetings in 2006 shows that top leaders of the Fed — several of whom continue to hold key positions today — had a limited awareness of the gravity of the threat that the weakness in the housing market posed to the rest of the economy. And they had what turned out to be an excessive optimism about how well things would turn out. …

    A Fed economist reported in a 2006 meeting that “we have not seen — and don’t expect — a broad deterioration in mortgage credit quality.” That turned out to be incorrect.

     

    http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/

     

  • Mortgage Slang 101 – Mortgage Insurance, Brett Reichel, Brettreichel.com


    Mortgage insurance is viewed nearly universally as a bad thing, but in reality, it’s a tool to be used that is very good for home buyers, the housing market and the economy in general.

    Why do many complain about mortgage insurance?  Because it’s expensive, and sometimes difficult to get rid of when it’s no longer necassary.  If that’s the case, why do I say it’s good for buyers and the economy?  Because it’s a tool that allows people to buy a home with less than twenty percent down.

    Mortgage insurance insures the lender against the risk of the buyers default on the loan.  It does NOT insure the buyers life, like many people think.

    The single biggest hurdle for home buyers is accumulating an adequate down payment.  Lenders want buyers to put twenty percent down for two reasons.  First, a buyer with a large down payment is less likely to quit making their payments.  Second, if a buyer does default, the more the buyer put down usually means more equity in the house when the lender forecloses, which means the lender loses less money.

    But, if a buyer wants to buy a $200,000 and has to put up a twenty percent down, that will equal a $40,000 down payment!  Hard to save up, for most buyers.  BUT, with the use of mortgage insurance, that buyer might be able to put as little as $6,000 down!  A lot easier to save.

    So, mortgage insurance can be a very benficial tool.

    With that being said, don’t let your lender shoehorn you into only considering monthly mortgage insurance.  There are other options such as single premium mortgage insurance, or “split” mortgage insurance.  These programs can be more expensive up front, but sometimes much less expensive over time.  They don’t work for everyone, but they certainly should be looked into.

     

    Brett Reichel
    Brettreichel.com

  • Oregon’s Shadow Inventory – The “New Normal”?, by Phil Querin, Q-Law.com


    The sad reality is that negative equity, short sales, and foreclosures, will likely be around for quite a while.  “Negative equity”, which is the excess by which total debt encumbering the home exceeds its present fair market value, is almost becoming a fact of life. We know from theRMLS™ Market Action report that average and median prices this summer have continued to fall over the same time last year.  The main reason is due to the volume of  “shadow inventory”. This term refers to the amorphous number of homes – some of which we can count, such as listings and pendings–and much of which we can only estimate, such as families on the cusp of default, but current for the moment.  Add to this “shadow” number, homes already 60 – 90 days delinquent, those already in some stage of foreclosure, and those post-foreclosure properties held as bank REOs, but not yet on the market, and it starts to look like a pretty big number.  By some estimates, it may take nearly four years to burn through all of the shadow inventory. Digging deeper into the unknowable, we cannot forget the mobility factor, i.e. people needing or wanting to sell due to potential job relocation, changes in lifestyle, family size or retirement – many of these people, with and without equity, are still on the sidelines and difficult to estimate.

    As long as we have shadow inventory, prices will remain depressed.[1] Why? Because many of the homes coming onto the market will be ones that have either been short sold due to negative equity, or those that have been recently foreclosed.  In both cases, when these homes close they become a new “comp”, i.e. the reference point for pricing the next home that goes up for sale.  [A good example of this was the first batch of South Waterfront condos that went to auction in 2009.  The day after the auction, those sale prices became the new comps, not only for the unsold units in the building holding the auction, but also for many of the neighboring buildings. – PCQ]

    All of these factors combine to destroy market equilibrium.  That is, short sellers’ motivation is distorted.  Homeowners with negative equity have little or no bargaining power.  Pricing is driven by the “need” to sell, coupled with the lender’s decision to “bite the bullet” and let it sell.  Similarly, for REO property, pricing is motivated by the banks’ need to deplete inventory to make room for more foreclosures.  A primary factor limiting sales of bank REO property is the desire not to flood the market and further depress pricing. Only when market equilibrium is restored, i.e. a balance is achieved where both sellers and buyers have roughly comparable bargaining power, will we see prices start to rise. Today, that is not the case – even for sellers with equity in their homes.  While equity sales are faster than short sales, pricing is dictated by buyers’ perception of value, and value is based upon the most recent short sale or REO sale.

    So, the vicious circle persists.  In today’s world of residential real estate, it is a fact of life.  The silver lining, however, is that most Realtors® are becoming much more adept – and less intimidated – by the process.  They understand these new market dynamics and are learning to deal with the nuances of short sales and REOs.  This is a very good thing, since it does, indeed, appear as if this will be the “new normal” for quite a while.

  • Battle Brews Over Responsibility For Defaulted West Coast Bank Home Loans in Oregon, By Jeff Manning, The Oregonian The Oregonian


    Did former Bend banker Jeff Sprague go rogue during the housing boom and make a series of dishonest loans egregious enough to get him charged with bank fraud?

     
    Or was he a low-level flunky just following orders from his bank-executive bosses who knew and approved of what he was doing?
     
    Those are the questions at the heart of a legal battle between Sprague and his former employer, West Coast Bank. Sprague, facing criminal fraud charges stemming from a series of 2007 loans he handled to employees of Desert Sun Development, has subpoenaed the Lake Oswego bank attempting to force it to hand over internal documents, including the findings of its own investigation into loans that Sprague handled.
     
    Federal prosecutors have asked for many of the same documents.
     
    The bank has handed over some of the requested material. But it has refused to give up about 100 documents claiming they are protected by attorney-client privilege.
     
    The material could shine a new light on the behavior and lending standards of the Lake Oswego bank during the crazy days of the real estate boom. Banks all over the country dispensed with their characteristic caution during much of the last decade and made billions of dollars worth of residential loans with little if any due diligence.
     
    The industry came to regret its recklessness after borrowers defaulted in enormous number. The industry’s slipshod lending helped send the American economy into a tailspin from which it has yet to recover.
     
    Robert Sznewajs, West Coast Bank CEO, declined comment, as did the bank’s Portland attorney David Angeli.
     
    Sprague’s fight over the documents may be a long-shot. Attorney-client privilege is a well-accepted legal doctrine that ensures the confidentiality of communications between a client and attorney.
     
    But the bank’s refusal also begs the question: What is it hiding?
     
    CRIMES AND INVESTIGATIONS

    The stakes are high for Sprague. He and his former assistant, Barbara Hotchkiss, were among 13 indicted on fraud or related charges in November 2009 in the Desert Sun case. Prosecutors allege that the Central Oregon real estate developer convinced West Coast and several other banks to loan the company or its employees $41 million through falsified and forged loan applications.
     
     
    The West Coast loans handled by Sprague went to Desert Sun employees, who were participating in the company’s home ownership program. Designed to capitalize on Central Oregon’s red-hot housing market, the company offered to build homes for employees and associates and then split the sales proceeds. But Desert Sun allegedly pocketed the loan proceeds, sometimes completing little if any work on the home for which the employee now owed hundreds of thousands of dollars.
     
     
    Several of the defendants have agreed to plead guilty, including Shannon Egeland and Jeremy Kendall, two former senior executives of the company. Desert Sun CEO Tyler Fitzsimons maintains his innocence.
     
     
    Scott Bradford, the Eugene-based prosecutor leading the case for the government, declined to comment.
     
     
    Desert Sun remains the biggest criminal case in Oregon to emerge from the housing boom and bust. It is also one of the few cases nationally in which bankers were charged with crimes. Senior executives from the financial industry have gone virtually untouched in the subsequent wave of investigations and prosecutions.
     
     
    No West Coast executives have been accused of wrongdoing, either in criminal or civil jurisdictions.
     
     
    Federal prosecutors allege that Sprague and Hotchkiss knowingly helped originate and process phony loans. The loan applications contained forged signatures and inflated claims of the borrowers’ financial wherewithal.
     
     
    Attorneys for Sprague and Hotchkiss say their clients were simply following the West Coast Bank playbook.
     
     
    Sprague helped originate so-called stated-income loans, a widely use during the boom in which the lender made no effort to verify an applicant’s earnings. Sprague routinely offered general guidelines to loan applicants as to the income or assets they would have to list in order to qualify.
     
     
    “I think the bank is hiding that they knew that this loan process was in place and that they approved of it,” said Marc Friedman, a Eugene attorney representing Sprague.
     
     
    John Kolego, attorney for Hotchkiss, agreed. “I think these lending practices originated pretty high up in the organization,” he said. “There’s a pretty good chance there’s a smoking gun here, if we could just get the documents.”
     
     
    Hotchkiss was Sprague’s assistant who did the routine work of processing loans. “She worked for the bank for less than two years,” Kolego said. “She was making $28,000 a year.”
     
     
    Sprague did decidedly better, earning both a salary and commissions on loans he originated. Reports that Sprague was bringing home a six-figure salary during the boom is an exaggeration, Friedman said, adding that he didn’t know exactly how much his client made.
     
     
    In any case, the material withheld by the bank is necessary to support Sprague’s defense and “may, in fact, show that he initiated the investigation after discovering hints of fraudulent activity,” according to his court filings.
     
     
    Court filings make clear the bank did hand over to the government material it did not feel was privileged. Following the typical rules of discovery, the U.S. attorney’s office then shared those documents with Friedman and other attorneys for the defendants.
     
     
    Court filings also include a list of about 100 other documents the bank refused to hand over. It filed a motion to quash Sprague’s subpoena arguing that the materials are shielded from discovery under attorney-client privilege.
     
     
    Federal Magistrate Thomas Coffin is expected to rule shortly on the bank’s motion.
     
     

    FAILURE DOESN’T EQUAL FRAUD

     
     
    The scrap over the documents is another reminder of West Coast Bank’s ill-fated “two-step” loan program.
     
     
    Though not historically a big home mortgage lender, the bank pushed aggressively into some of the hotter housing markets around the Northwest with its “two-step” program, a short-term construction loan. By most accounts, the program was the brainchild of David Simons, a bank senior vice president and manager of residential lending.
     
     
    West Coast linked up with U.S. Funding, a Vancouver mortgage brokerage, for more client referrals. Two-step was geared for flippers, investors who had every intention of immediately selling the new home rather than living in it. Bank officials agreed to 100 percent financing even for borrowers they never met.
     
     
    By the end of 2007, West Coast had grown its two-step portfolio from next to nothing to $341 million, more than 16 percent of its total loans.
     
     
    Then, the boom ended.
     
     
    The bank’s loan portfolio suffered on all fronts, but its two-step loans went bad in enormous numbers. In Lebanon, where West Coast loaned home flippers nearly $16 million for about 45 homes in a new, relatively high-end subdivision, it eventually repossessed more than 40 of them. In all, the bank repossessed 422 properties from failed two-step loans, according to SEC filings.
     
     
    West Coast reported in its 2009 10-k annual report that its non-performing two-step loans peaked at $127.7 million in the third quarter of 2008, nearly a third of the total.
     
     
    Sprague and Simons left the bank after its Desert Sun investigation.
     
     
    Criminal investigators from the FBI and other federal agencies continue to probe West Coast’s two-step lending in Lebanon, Happy Valley and elsewhere.
     
     
    Ken Roberts, a Portland attorney noted for his work with local banks, said its unfair to equate the failure of West Coast’s two-step program with fraud or other wrongdoing. Thousands of banks jumped on the housing bandwagon last decade and few of them anticipated the boom ending, let alone a painful crash leading, millions of foreclosures and 30 percent declines in home values, Roberts said.
     
     
    Federal and state bank regulators did single out West Coast in October 2009, issuing a cease and desist order requiring the bank to raise new capital and clean up its act. The FDIC and the Oregon Department of Finance and Corporate Securities did so after they had determined the bank “had engaged in unsafe and unsound practices.” The agencies ordered the bank to, among other things, cut all ties with employees, borrowers or anyone else suspected of fraudulent activity.
     
     
    That same month, West Coast raised $155 million by essentially selling an 80 percent equity stake in the bank to outside investors. The transaction and the new capital probably saved the bank. It also vastly diluted the value of the stock held by existing investors.
     
     
    The West Coast board of directors in 2010 awarded CEO Sznewajs $870,89, a hefty raise from the $407,545 he got paid the year before.
     
     
    Sprague, meanwhile has left banking and is working as a carpenter. His marriage ended. “He’s taken some really big hits,” Friedman said.
  • No End in Sight: Mortgage Loans Harder in High-Foreclosure Areas by Brian O’Connell, Mainstreet.com


    NEW YORK (MainStreet) — Here’s another bitter pill for homeowners to swallow: If you live in an area with a high foreclosure rate, the chances of someone getting a loan to buy your house significantly decreases.

    The news comes from the Federal Reserve’s latestreport, in which it concluded that mortgage lending was dramatically lower in communities and neighborhoods where foreclosures were surging, using data from the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) and from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).

    “Home-purchase lending in highly distressed census tracts identified by the Neighborhood Stabilization Program was 75% lower in 2010 than it had been in these same tracts in 2005,” the report said. “This decline was notably larger than that experienced in other tracts, and appears to primarily reflect a much sharper decrease in lending to higher-income borrowers in the highly distressed neighborhoods.”

    The Fed uses the term “highly distressed” in place of the word “foreclosure”, but the message is clear: Banks and mortgage lenders are taking a big step back from lending to buyers who want a home in a high-foreclosure neighborhood.

    It’s the same deal for borrowers who want to actually live in a home and buyers who want to purchase the property as aninvestment, as neither party seems to be having much luck in getting a home loan in a highly distressed neighborhood, according to the Fed. The lack of credit extended to investors could really hurt neighborhoods crippled by foreclosures.

    “In the current period of high foreclosures and elevated levels of short sales, investor activity helps reduce the overhang of unsold and foreclosed properties,” the Federal Reserve says.

    Overall, the Fed reports that 76% fewer mortgage loans were granted to “non-owner occupant” buyers in 2010, compared to 2005.

    The Fed’s report reveals some other trends in the mortgage market:

    • Mortgage originations declined from just under 9 million loans to fewer than 8 million loans between 2009 and 2010. Most significant was the decline in the number of refinance loans despite historically low baseline mortgage interest rates throughout the year.  Home-purchase loans also declined, but less so than the decline in refinance lending.
    • While loans originated under the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance program and the Department of Veterans Affairs‘ (VA) loan guarantee program continue to account for a historically large proportion of loans, such lending fell more than did other types of lending.
    • In the absence of home equity problems and underwriting changes, roughly 2.3 million first-lien owner-occupant refinance loans would have been made during 2010 on top of the 4.5 million such loans that were actually originated.
    • A sharp drop in home-purchase lending activity occurred in the middle of 2010, right alongside the June closing deadline (although the deadline was retroactively extended to September). The ending of this program during 2010 may help explain the decline in the incidence of home-purchase lending to lower-income borrowers between the first and second halves of the year.

    All in all, the report offers a pretty bleak – but even-handed and thorough – review of today’s home-purchase market.

    Read more about the continuing effects of the housing crisis at MainStreet’s Foreclosure topic page.

  • Owners Escape Tax Debt By Rebuying Foreclosed Homes, by Christine MacDonald/ The Detroit News


    Detroit —Landlord Jeffrey Cusimano didn’t pay property taxes on seven of his east-side rentals for three years, owing the city of Detroit more than $131,800.

    Typically, that would mean losing the properties. But Cusimano not only got to keep them — his debt, including interest, fees and unpaid water bills, was virtually wiped free.

    Cusimano and a growing number of Detroit property owners are using a little-known loophole to erase tax debt by letting their properties go into foreclosure and then buying them back a month later at the Wayne County Treasurer‘s auction for pennies on the dollar.

    It’s legal. But that doesn’t mean it’s fair, said homeowner Marilynn Alexander, who lives on Fairmount next door to one of Cusimano’s rentals. The landlord owed $26,200 in taxes and other fees on the bungalow, but bought it back in October for $1,051.

    “He shouldn’t be able to get away with that,” said Alexander, a 57-year-old laundry worker who said she scrapes together every year her $1,500 in property taxes at the house where she’s lived for 20 years. “That’s not a fair break to anybody else out here.”

    Critics described it as a growing problem as the foreclosure crisis deepens. A record number of properties — nearly 14,300 — are expected to be auctioned this fall, and officials predict more owners will try to buy back their properties.

    The News identified about 200 of nearly 3,700 Detroit properties sold at auction last year that appeared to be bought back by owners, some under the names of relatives or different companies and many for $500. The total in taxes and other debts wiped away was about $1.8 million.

    “I don’t think it’s OK; it’s just how things are,” said Cusimano, who argues Detroit taxes are so unfairly high he was forced to buy back the foreclosed properties.

    At the September auction, the properties’ prices are the debt that’s owed. But in October, the county treasurer sells off whatever is left at a $500 opening bid. That’s where most of the sales happen, including owners buying back their properties.

    There’s an effort in Lansing to ban the practice, but others defend it.

    Many of those defenders are struggling homeowners, said Ted Phillips, who runs a legal advocacy nonprofit agency. He helped about 140 families buy their houses back last year and expects to “easily” double that in October.

    “It’s absolutely better to have folks in their homes,” said Phillips, executive director of the United Community Housing Coalition.

    “The system is just so broken. This is a little bit of a way to correct the broken system. Not a great way, but a way.”

    But he agreed that others who can afford to pay the taxes are exploiting the loophole and should be stopped.

    Besides Cusimano, well-known land speculator Michael Kelly bought back three properties last fall through a company he is affiliated with to erase a $37,595 debt. The News profiled the Grosse Pointe Woods investor who, through the tax sale, gained control of more Detroit properties than any other private landowner as of earlier this year.

    Cusimano, who owns about 80 rentals, makes no apologies and blamed Detroit for failing to reduce his assessments on homes whose values have crashed. He said he’s got small bungalows with $4,000-a-year tax bills, which he argues sometimes is more than the house is worth.

    “The taxes are ridiculous,” Cusimano said. “I don’t even pay that for my house in Clinton Township.”

    Huge debts wiped clean

    The savings can be striking.

    One owner bought back her storefront on West Seven Mile last year for $15,000, eliminating nearly $37,000 in debt. Another owed $23,100 on two buildings and a parking lot on Conant, but bought each back for the minimum $500.

    And Cusimano got his seven rentals back for $4,051, erasing nearly $128,000 in property taxes and other government liens.

    Cusimano, a landlord in the city for two decades, said the method wasn’t his first choice. He said he tried to appeal his high taxes without success. He admits he’s taking advantage of the loophole, but said he must to survive the tough economic times.

    “You just have to go with how the system goes,” said Cusimano. “I have been learning that in the last few years.”

    Owners often buy back their properties using the same name under which they lost them. And there’s generally a low risk of getting outbid because of the glut of vacant land. Last fall, at least 6,847 parcels in Detroit went into the city’s inventory after they didn’t sell at auction.

    Landlord Allen Shifman justified his buys, saying “every house is going to the highest bidder.” He owed $35,300 on three properties owned by one business in which he has an interest, but bought them back under another affiliated business for $3,500.

    Shifman described them as “garbage properties” even though the city puts the three houses’ market value between $20,000 and $60,000. He said many of the city’s landlords are struggling.

    “It didn’t work out that well for me,” Shifman said of repurchasing the properties. “I didn’t get anything for my money.

    “The taxes are more than it’s worth. The houses don’t have any value at all. If the properties were worth the value of the houses, people would pay the taxes.”

    Detroit’s tax rates — 65 mills for homeowners and 83 mills on other property owners — are the highest in the state, according to a recent Citizens Research Council of Michigan report. The average statewide rate is 31 mills for homeowners and 48 mills for other property owners.

    Dan Lijana, a spokesman for Mayor Dave Bing, said the city has been reducing residential assessments “in the double-digit range” over the last four years, but that “distressed sales,” such as the sales from the county auction, can’t be a factor.

    Cusimano’s neighbors on Fairmount, a street in northeast Detroit with mostly maintained aluminum-sided bungalows, argued they are paying taxes and were angered when told of the loophole.

    “OK, he gets to buy his back and my mother has to struggle?” said Tekena Crutcher, who lives with her mom. “The city is the way it is because of people like him not paying his taxes.”

    Alexander said she’s suffering from throat cancer, but pays her taxes.

    “It’s disappointing to know that the system is set up like that and things like this are allowed to happen,” she said.

    Lijana said City Hall is looking at the city’s tax structure and the auction loophole.

    “We are working to make the City of Detroit run more like a business,” Lijana said in an email. “This is an example of a challenge that we are looking to address both from a fiscal perspective and as a land use policy.”

    Legislation aimed to stop it

    Wayne County Chief Deputy Treasurer David Szymanski, whose office runs the auction, said it’s frustrating to see people ditch tax obligations, but the law allows for it.

    “There is no restriction in the law about who can or cannot bid at auction,” Szymanski said. “It’s such a tough issue.”

    “It’s clearly in the best interest to keep people in their homes. But it’s a very bitter pill for the people next door.”

    Mah-Lon Grant, 62, and Gloria Grant, 57, said they would be homeless and their house likely gutted if Phillips’ nonprofit group hadn’t helped them buy it back.

    Their debt only was about $5,500, but it was overwhelming.

    The couple got behind on their taxes after losing their landscaping business when Mah-Lon Grant went to prison in 2005 for five years on felony firearm and assault charges, according to state records. He said the situation got out of control while he was defending himself as he collected a debt from an associate.

    “If we had to do it ourselves, I don’t think we would have been able to do it,” Mah-Lon Grant said. “There’s no way we could catch up.”

    “We are barely surviving.”

    The couple was able to buy the house, where they’ve lived for 34 years, back at auction for $500. They live there with their 22-year-old son and 15-month-old great-granddaughter.

    He said his family is different from other property owners using the loophole.

    “They are doing it for profit,” Grant said. “We are doing it for survival.”

    State Sen. Tupac Hunter, D-Detroit, has introduced legislation to ban buyers who owe back taxes.

    He said he’s looking to retool it to make sure nonprofits can buy properties on behalf of families, such as the Grants.

    But Hunter said he wants to stop “land speculation and the scavenging currently going on in Wayne County’s tax foreclosure auctions.”

    “My intent is to make it more difficult for land speculators to game the system,” Hunter wrote in an email.

    Szymanski said his office opposes Hunter’s bill because it’s too restrictive, but is brainstorming ways to prevent owners who can pay their taxes from buying back properties.

    “We want to help people in need, not make people rich,” Szymanski said.

    But Shifman and others who oppose limits on who can buy at auction said it will only hurt taxpayers further.

    All the revenue raised at the auction goes back to the city, schools and library.

    “I don’t know what the county is going to do without all those proceeds,” Shifman said. “You will eliminate a lot of buyers.”

    cmacdonald@detnews.com

    (313) 222-2396

    From The Detroit News: http://detnews.com/article/20110907/METRO01/109070383/Owners-escape-tax-debt-by-rebuying-foreclosed-homes#ixzz1XJMP2BOJ

  • Tying Health Problems to Rise in Home Foreclosures , by S. MITRA KALITA , Wall street Journal


    The threat of losing your home is stressful enough to make you ill, it stands to reason. Now two economists have measured just how unhealthy the foreclosure crisis has been in some of the hardest-hit areas of the U.S.

    New research by Janet Currie of Princeton University and Erdal Tekin of Georgia State University shows a direct correlation between foreclosure rates and the health of residents in Arizona, California, Florida and New Jersey. The economists concluded in a paper published this month by the National Bureau of Economic Research that an increase of 100 foreclosures corresponded to a 7.2% rise in emergency room visits and hospitalizations for hypertension, and an 8.1% increase for diabetes, among people aged 20 to 49.

    Each rise of 100 foreclosures was also associated with 12% more visits related to anxiety in the same age category. And the same rise in foreclosures was associated with 39% more visits for suicide attempts among the same group, though this still represents a small number of patients, the researchers say.

    Teasing out cause and effect can be delicate, and correlation doesn’t necessarily mean foreclosures directly cause health problems. Financial duress, among other issues, could lead to health problems—and cause foreclosures, too.

    The economists didn’t find similar patterns with diseases such as cancer or elective surgeries such as hip replacement, leading them to conclude that areas with high foreclosures are seeing mostly an increase of stress-related ailments.

     

    Tuesday brought news of further weakness in the housing market as the closely watched S&P/Case-Shiller home-price index came in 5.9% lower for the second quarter from a year earlier. Continued job losses and economic uncertainty could weigh on home prices and make for another wave of foreclosures, economists say.

    It may not just be foreclosure victims arriving at hospitals—but neighbors also grappling with depleting equity in their biggest investment.

    “You see foreclosures having a general effect on the neighborhood,” Ms. Currie says. “Everybody’s stressed out. There is a connection between people’s economic well being and their physical well being.”

    The situation got so bad for Patricia Graci, a 51-year-old Staten Island, N.Y., resident, that she canceled a recent court appearance related to the foreclosure on her house because she couldn’t get out of bed. After her husband lost his job as a painter in 2008, the Gracis relied on savings to pay their mortgage for two years.

    “Everything was going downhill. My savings were going down to nothing,” says Ms. Graci. “When I realized the money wasn’t there anymore, I started getting very anxious and depressed.”

    She says her lender advised her to default on her mortgage to qualify for a loan modification. Ms. Graci, who was an assistant bank manager and already had rheumatoid arthritis, says she began seeing a therapist and landed in the hospital with difficulty breathing in December 2009. A few weeks later came the foreclosure notice from the bank.

    “They told me it was more anxiety and stress that made me wind up in the hospital than the arthritis,” Ms. Graci says. After repeatedly missing work due to illness, Ms. Graci went on long-term disability.

    The areas that have the highest foreclosure rates also tend to have a large portion of their population unemployed, underemployed or uninsured. Ms. Currie says the research accounted for this by instituting controls for persistent differences among areas, such as poverty rates, as well as for county-level trends. Much of the 2005-2009 period examined came before unemployment peaked, too, she says. The researchers examined hospital-visit numbers and foreclosure rates in all ZIP Codes that had those data available.

    The areas that have the highest foreclosure rates also tend to have a large portion of their population unemployed, underemployed or uninsured. Ms. Currie says the research accounted for this by instituting controls for persistent differences among areas, such as poverty rates, as well as for county-level trends. The time period examined, 2005 to 2007, was before unemployment peaked, she says. The researchers examined hospital-visit numbers and foreclosure rates in all ZIP Codes that had those data available.

    They found that areas in the top fifth of foreclosure activity have more than double the number of visits for preventable conditions that generally don’t require hospitalization than the bottom fifth.

    At the local hospital in Homestead, Fla., a city of mostly single-family, middle-class homes about 30 miles from Miami, the emergency room has been bustling. Emergency visits to the hospital in 2010 more than doubled from 10 years earlier to about 67,000, and emergency department medical director Otto Vega says they will surpass 70,000 this year. Homestead has the highest rate of mortgage delinquencies in the U.S.—in June, 41% of mortgage holders in the hardest-hit ZIP Code of Homestead were 90 days or more past due on payments, according to real-estate data firm CoreLogic Inc.

    While the most common ailments are respiratory problems and pneumonia, Dr. Vega notes an increase in psychosomatic disorders, such as patients with chest pain and shortness of breath, and others who feel suicidal. “A lot of young people, less than 50 years old, have chest pain. You know it’s anxiety,” he says.

    Nationwide, overall emergency-room visits have also been rising, growing 5% from 2007 to 127.3 million in 2009, according to the American Hospital Association. But inpatient stays have largely kept pace with population growth over the last decade, says Beth Feldpush, a vice president for policy and advocacy at the National Association of Public Hospitals.

    The number of people covered by employer-sponsored insurance has been falling, she says. “When people don’t have insurance, they put off seeking care for too long and end up in the emergency room.”

    And some of those seeking treatment had medical conditions before foreclosure—but the stress of losing their homes has exacerbated their ailments.

    In 2008, Norman Adelman of Freehold, N.J., called his lender to ask for a forbearance of three or four months, saying he was about to undergo knee-replacement surgery. The lender complied and Mr. Adelman, who runs a home-energy business, says he began scaling back his work. He underwent needed tests and doctor visits.

    After two months of not paying his mortgage, he successfully applied for a loan modification, taking his monthly payment from $2,700 to $1,900. But then the loan was sold—and a new servicer didn’t recognize the terms of the arrangement, he says.

    Mr. Adelman is fighting the new lender but says he has been in and out of the hospital for the last two years. He never had his knees replaced and is now on antidepressants and antianxiety medication.

    “He’s deteriorated. He’s had sleepless nights,” says his wife, Shulamis. “You always have this fear of being thrown out. He’s just gotten worse and worse from not sleeping.”

    Earlier this month, after working with the nonprofit Staten Island Legal Services, Ms. Graci received a trial loan modification. “I’m happy but I am still scared,” she says. “I want a permanent solution. I don’t know if I am in the clear.”

    Write to S. Mitra Kalita at mitra.kalita@wsj.com

    Corrections & Amplifications
    The researchers examined the years 2005 through 2009. An earlier version of this article incorrectly implied the research only covered 2005 through 2007

     

     

  • Promoting Housing Recovery Parts 1 and 2, by Patrick Pulatie


    Previously, I have posted articles regarding housing and foreclosure issues. The purpose was to begin a dialogue on the steps to be taken to alleviate the foreclosure crisis, and to promote housing recovery.   Now, we need to explore how to restart lending in the private sector.  This will be a three part article, with parts I and II herein, and III in the next post.

    To begin, we must understand how we got to the point of where we are today, and whereby housing became so critical a factor in the economy. (This is only an overview. I leave it to the historians to fill in all the details.)

    Part One – Agreeing On The Problems

    Historical Backdrop

    At the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S. population stood about 76,000,000 people. By the end of 2000, the population was over 310 million. The unprecedented growth in population resulted in the housing industry and related services becoming one of several major engines of wealth creation during the 20th century.

    During the Depression, large numbers of farm and home foreclosures were occurring. The government began to get involved in housing to stop foreclosures and stimulate housing growth. This resulted in the creation of an FHA/Fannie Mae– like program, to support housing.

    WWII led to major structural changes in the U.S., both economically and culturally. Manufacturing and technological changes spurred economic growth. Women entered the work force in huge numbers. Returning veterans came back from the war desiring to leave the rural areas, begin families, and enter the civilian workforce. The result was the baby boom generation and its coming influence.

    From the 1950s through the 1970s, the US dominated the world economically. Real income growth was occurring for all households. Homeownership was obtainable for ever increasing numbers of people. Consumerism was rampant.

    To support homeownership, the government created Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac so that more people could partake in the American Dream. These entities would eventually become the primary source of mortgages in the U.S. F&F changed the way mortgages were funded, and changed the terms of mortgages, so that 30 year mortgages became the common type of loan, instead of 5 to 15 year mortgages.

    Storm clouds were beginning to appear on the horizon at the same time. Japan, Korea, Germany, and other countries had now come out of their post war depressions. Manufacturing and industrial bases had been rebuilt. These countries now posed an economic threat to the U.S. by offering improved products, cheaper labor costs, and innovation. By the end of the 1970s, for many reasons, US manufacturing was decreasing, and service related industries were gaining importance.

    In the 1980s and 1990s, manufacturing began to decline in the U.S. Service Industries were now becoming a major force in the economy. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, defense spending began to decline dramatically, further depressing the economy.

    In the early 1990s, F&F engaged in efforts to increase their share of the mortgage market. They freely admitted wanting to control the housing market, and took steps to do so, undermining lenders and competition, and any attempts to regulate them.

    In 1994, homeownership rates were at 64% in the US. President Clinton, along with Congress and in conjunction with Fannie and Freddie, came out with a new program with the intent to promote a 70% homeownership rate. This program was promoted even though economists generally considered 64% to be the maximum amount of homeownership that an economy could readily support. Above 64%, people would be 

    “buying” homes, but without having the financial capabilities to repay a loan. The program focused upon low income persons and minorities. The result was greater demand for housing and homeownership, and housing values began to increase.

    Lenders and Wall Street were being pushed out of the housing market by F&F, and had to find new markets to serve. F&F did not want to service the new markets being created by the government homeownership programs. The result was that Wall Street would naturally gravitate to that market, which was generally subprime, and also to the jumbo market, which F&F could not serve due to loan amount restrictions. This was the true beginning of securitized loan products.

    The events of 9/11 would ultimately stoke the fires of home ownership even further. 9/11 occurred as the US was coming out of a significant recession, and to keep the country from sliding back into recession, the Fed lowered interest rates and kept them artificially low until 2003. Wall Street, recognizing the promise of good financial returns from securitized loans, freed up more and more capital for banks and mortgage bankers to lend. This led to even greater demand for homes and mortgages.

    To meet the increased demand, home construction exploded. Ancillary services did well also, from infrastructure, schools, hospitals, roads, building materials, and home decor. The economy was booming, even though this was “mal-investment” of resources. (Currently, as a result of this activity, there are estimated to be from 2m to 3.5m in excess housing units, with approximately 400k being added yearly to housing stock.)

    It did not stop there. Buyers, in their increasing zeal, were bidding for homes, increasing the price of homes in many states by 50 to 100,000 dollars more than what was reasonable. The perception was that if they did not buy now, then they could never buy. Additionally, investors began to purchase multiple properties, hoping to create a home rental empire. This led to unsustainable home values.

    Concurrently, the Fed was still engaged in a loose money policy. This pumped hundreds of billions of dollars into the housing economy, with predictable results. With increasing home values, homeowners could refinance their homes, often multiple times over, pulling cash out and keeping the economy pumped up artificially. A homeowner could pull out 50,000 to 100,000 dollars or more, often every year or two, and use that money to indulge themselves, pretending they had a higher standard of living than what existed. The government knew that this was not a reasonable practice, but indulged in it anyway, so as to keep up an appearance of a healthy economy. Of course, this only compounded the problem.

    The end result of the past 40 years of government intervention (and popular support for that intervention) has been a housing market that is currently overbuilt and still overvalued. In the meantime, real wages have not increased since the mid 1990s and for large numbers of the population, negative income growth has been experienced. Today, all segments of the population, homeowners especially so, are saddled with significant mortgage debt, consumer debt, and revolving credit debt. This has led to an inability on the part of the population to buy homes or other products. Until wage and debt issues are resolved, employment increases, and housing prices have returned to more reasonable values, there can be no housing recovery.

    Current Status

    As all know, the current status of housing in the US is like a ship dead in the water, with no ability to steer except to roll with the waves. A recap:

    Private securitization once accounted for over 25% of all mortgage loans. These efforts are currently nonexistent except for one entity, Redwood Trust, which has issued one securitized offerings in 2010 and one in 2011. Other than this, Wall Street is afraid to invest in Mortgage Products (to say nothing of downstream investors).

    Banks are unable to lend their own money, which represented up to 15% of all lending. Most banks are capital impaired and have liquidity issues, as well as unknown liabilities from bad loans dating to the bubble.

    Additionally, banks are suffering from a lack of qualified borrowers. Either there is no equity in the home to lend on, or the borrowers don’t have the financial ability to afford the loan. Therefore, the only lending that a bank can engage in is to execute loans and sell them to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or VA and FHA. There are simply no other options available.

    F&F are buying loans from the banks, but their lending standards have increased, so the loan purchases are down. F&F still distort the market because of government guarantees on their loans (now explicit instead of implicit), and they are still able to purchase loans above $700k, which was implemented in response to the housing crisis.

    F&F are still having financial issues, with the government having bailed them out to the tune of $140b, with much more to come.

    VA is buying loans and doing reasonably well, but they serve a tiny portion of the market.

    FHA has turned into the new subprime, accepting credit challenged borrowers, and with loan to values of 95% or greater. Default rates on FHA loans are rising significantly, and will pose issues for the government when losses absorb all FHA loss reserves, which may have already happened (depending on how you look at the accounting).

    The Mortgage Insurance companies are financially depressed, with PMI being forced to stop writing new policies due to loan loss reserves being depleted. Likely, they will cease business or be absorbed by another company. Other companies are believed to be similarly in trouble, though none have failed yet.

    The US population is still overburdened with debt. It is believed that the household consumer debt burden is over 11%, for disposable income. This is far too high for effective purchasing of any products, especially high end. (There has been a lessening of this debt from its high of 14% in 2008, but this has primarily been the result of defaults, so most of those persons are not in a position to buy.)

    Patrick Pulatie is the CEO of LFI Analytics. He can be reached at 925-522-0371, or 925-238-1221 for further information. http://www.LFI-Analytics.com, patrick@lfi-analytics.com.

  • Pre-Foreclosure Short Sales Jump 19% in Second Quarter by Carrie Bay, DSNEWS.com


    An example of a real estate owned property in ...
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    Short sales shot up 19 percent between the first and second quarters, with 102,407 transactions completed during the April-to-June period, according to RealtyTrac.  Over the same timeframe, a total of 162,680 bank-owned REO homes sold to third parties, virtually unchanged from the first quarter.

    RealtyTrac’s study also found that the average time to complete a short sale is down, while the time it takes to sell an REO has increased.

    Pre-foreclosure short sales took an average of 245 days to sell after receiving the initial foreclosure notice during the second quarter, RealtyTrac says. That’s down from an average of 256 days in the first quarter and follows three straight quarters in which the sales cycle has increased.

    REOs that sold in the second quarter took an average of 178 days to sell after the foreclosure process was completed, which itself has been lengthening across the country. The REO sales cycle in Q2 increased slightly from 176 days in the first quarter, and is up from 164 days in the second quarter of 2010.

    Discounts on both short sales and REOs increased last quarter, according to RealtyTrac’s study, but homes sold pre-foreclosure carried less of a markdown when compared to non-distressed homes.

    Sales of homes in default or scheduled for auction prior to the completion of foreclosure had an average sales price nationwide of $192,129, a discount of 21 percent below the average sales price of non-foreclosure homes. The short sale price-cut is up from a 17 percent discount in the previous quarter and a 14 percent discount in the second quarter of 2010.

    Nationally, REOs had an average sales price of $145,211, a discount of nearly 40 percent below the average sales price of non-distressed homes. The REO discount was 36 percent in the previous quarter and 34 percent in the second quarter of 2010.

    Commenting on the latest short sale stats in particular, James Saccacio, RealtyTrac’s CEO, said, “The jump in pre-foreclosure sales volume coupled with bigger discounts…and a shorter average time to sell…all point to a housing market that is starting to focus on more efficiently clearing distressed inventory through more streamlined short sales.”

    Saccacio says short sales “give lenders the opportunity to more pre-emptively purge non-performing loans from their portfolios and avoid the long, costly and increasingly messy process of foreclosure and the subsequent sale of an REO.”

    Together, REOs and short sales accounted for 31 percent of all U.S. residential sales in the second quarter, RealtyTrac reports. That’s down from nearly 36 percent of all sales in the first quarter but up from 24 percent of all sales in the second quarter of 2010.

    States with the highest percentage of foreclosure-related sales – REOs and short sales – in the second quarter include Nevada (65%), Arizona (57%), California (51%), Michigan (41%), and Georgia (38%).

    States where foreclosure-related sales increased more than 30 percent between the first and second quarters include Delaware (33%), Wyoming (32%), and Iowa (30%).

     

  • The Meat of the Matter – In Re: Veal Analyzed, by Phil Querin, Q-Law.com


     

    “When a note is split from a deed of trust ‘the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.’ *** Additionally, if the deed of trust was assigned without the note, then the assignee, ‘having no interest in the underlying debt or obligation, has a worthless piece of paper.’” [In re Veal – United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (June 10, 2011)]

    Introduction. This case is significant for two reasons: First, it was heard and decided by a three-judge Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit, which includes Oregon.  Second, it represents the next battleground in the continuing foreclosure wars between Big Banks and Bantam Borrowers: The effect of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC”)on the transferability of the Promissory Note (or “Note”).

    Remember, the Trust Deed follows the Note.  If a lender is the owner of a Trust Deed, but cannot produce the actual Note which it secures, the Trust Deed is useless, since the lender is unable to prove it is owed the debt.  Conversely, if the lender owns the Note, but not the Trust Deed, it cannot foreclose the secured property. [For a poetic perspective on the peripatetic lives of a Note and Trust Deed, connect here. – PCQ]

    By now, most observers are aware that Oregon’s mandatory recording statute, ORS 86.735(1), has been a major impediment to lenders and servicers seeking trying to foreclose borrowers.  Two major Oregon cases, the first in federal bankruptcy court, In re McCoy, and the other, in federal district trial court, Hooker v. Bank of America, et. al, based their decisions to halt the banks’ foreclosures, squarely on the lenders’ failure to record all Trust Deed Assignments.  To date, however, scant mention has been made in these cases about ownership of the Promissory Note. [Presumably, this is because a clear violation of the Oregon’s recording statute is much easier to pitch to a judge, than having to explain the nuances – and there are many – of Articles 3 and 9 of the UCC.  – PCQ]

    Now we have In re: Veal, which was an appeal from the bankruptcy trial judge’s order granting Wells Fargo relief from the automatic stay provisions under federal bankruptcy law.   Such a ruling meant that Wells Fargo would be permitted to foreclose the Veals’ property.  But since this case arose in Arizona – not Oregon – our statutory law requiring the recording of all Assignments as a prerequisite to foreclosure, did not apply.  Instead, the Veals’ lawyer relied upon the banks’ failure to establish that it had any right under the UCC to enforce the Promissory Note.

    Legal Background. For reasons that do not need to be explained here, the Veals filed two contemporaneous appeals. One was against Wells Fargo Bank, which was acting as the Trustee for a REMIC, Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006–3, Asset–Backed Certificates Series 2006–3.  In the second appeal, the Veals challenged the bankruptcy court’s order overruling their objection to a proof of claim filed by Wells Fargo’s servicing agent, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“AHMSI”).

    Factual Background. In August 2006, the Veals executed a Promissory Note and Mortgage in favor of GSF Mortgage Corporation (“GSF”). On June 29, 2009, they filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  On July 18, 2009, AHMSI filed a proof of claim, on behalf of Wells Fargo as its servicing agent.  AHMSI included with its proof of claim the following documents:

    • A copy of the Note, showing an indorsement[1] from GSF to “Option One”[2];
    • A copy of the GSF’s Mortgage with the Veals;
    • A copy of a recorded “Assignment of Mortgage” assigning the Mortgage from GSF to Option One; and,
    • A letter dated May 15, 2008, signed by Jordan D. Dorchuck as Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer of AHMSI, addressed to “To Whom it May Concern”, stating that AHMSI acquired Option One’s mortgage servicing business.[3]

    The Veals argued that AHMSI [Wells’ servicing agent] lacked standing since neither AHMSI or Wells Fargo established that they were qualified holders of the Note under Arizona’s version of the UCC.

    In a belated and last ditch effort to establish its standing, Wells Fargo filed a copy of another Assignment of Mortgage, dated after it had already filed for relief from bankruptcy stay.  This Assignment purported to transfer to Wells Fargo the Mortgage held by “Sand Canyon Corporation formerly known as Option One Mortgage Corporation”.

    The 3-judge panel noted that neither of the assignments (the one from GSF to Option One and the other from Sand Canyon, Option One’s successor, to Wells) were authenticated – meaning that there were no supporting affidavits or other admissible evidence vouching for the authenticity of the documents.  In short, it again appears that none of the banks’ attorneys would swear that the copies were true and accurate reproductions of the original – or that they’d even seen the originals to compare them with.  With continuing reports of bogus and forged assignments, and robo-signed documents of questionable legal authority, it is not surprising that the bankruptcy panel viewed this so-called “evidence” with suspicion, and did not regard it as persuasive evidence.

    • As to the Assignment of Mortgage from GSF (the originating bank) to Option One, the panel noted that it purported to assign not only the Mortgage, but the Promissory Note as well.[4]
    • As to the Assignment of Mortgage from Sand Canyon [FKA Option One] to Wells Fargo[created after Wells Fargo’s motion for relied from stay], the panel said that the document did not contain language purporting to assign the Veals’ Promissory Note.  As a consequence[even had it been considered as evidence], it would not have provided any proof of the transfer of the Promissory Note to Wells Fargo. At most, it would only have been proof that the Mortgage had been assigned.

    After considerable discussion about the principles of standing versus real party in interest, the 3-judge panel focused on the latter, generally defining it as a rule protecting a defendant from being sued multiple times for the same obligation by different parties.

    Applicability of UCC Articles 3 and 9. The Veal opinion is well worth reading for a good discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code and its applicability to the transfer and enforcement of Promissory Notes.  The panel wrote that there are three ways to transfer Notes.  The most common method is for one to be the “holder” of the Note.  A person may be a “holder” if they:

    • Have possession of the Note and it has been made payable to them; or,
    • The Note is payable to the bearer [e.g. the note is left blank or payable to the “holder”.]
    • The third way to enforce the Note is by attaining the status of a “nonholder in possession of the [note] who has the rights of a holder.” To do so, “…the possessor of the note must demonstrate both the fact of the delivery and the purpose of the delivery of the note to the transferee in order to qualify as the “person entitled to enforce.”

    The panel concluded that none of Wells Fargo’s exhibits showed that it, or its agent, had actual possession of the Note.  Thus, it could not establish that it was a holder of the Note, or a “person entitled to enforce” it. The judges noted that:

    “In addition, even if admissible, the final purported assignment of the Mortgage was insufficient under Article 9 to support a conclusion that Wells Fargo holds any interest, ownership or otherwise, in the Note.  Put another way, without any evidence tending to show it was a “person entitled to enforce” the Note, or that it has an interest in the Note, Wells Fargo has shown no right to enforce the Mortgage securing the Note. Without these rights, Wells Fargo cannot make the threshold showing of a colorable claim to the Property that would give it prudential standing to seek stay relief or to qualify as a real party in interest.”

    As for Wells’ servicer, AHMSI, the panel reviewed the record and found nothing to establish that AHMSI was its lawful servicing agent.  AHMSI had presented no evidence as to who possessed the original Note.  It also presented no evidence showing indorsement of the Note either in its favor or in favor of Wells Fargo.  Without establishing these elements, AHMSI could not establish that it was a “person entitled to enforce” the Note.

    Quoting from the opinion:

    “When debtors such as the Veals challenge an alleged servicer’s standing to file a proof of claim regarding a note governed by Article 3 of the UCC, that servicer must show it has an agency relationship with a “person entitled to enforce” the note that is the basis of the claim. If it does not, then the servicer has not shown that it has standing to file the proof of claim. ***”

    Conclusion. Why is the Veal case important?  Let’s start with recent history: First, we know that during the securitization heydays of 2005 – 2007, record keeping and document retention were exceedingly lax.  Many in the lending and servicing industry seemed to think that somehow, MERS would reduce the paper chase.  However, MERS was not mandatory, and in any event, it captured at best, perhaps 60% of the lending industry.  Secondly, MERS tracked only Mortgages and Trust Deeds – not Promissory Notes.  So even if a lender can establish its ownership of the Trust Deed, that alone is not enough, without the Note, to permit the foreclosure.

    As recent litigation has revealed, some large lenders, such as Countrywide, made a habit of holding on to their Promissory Notes, rather than transferring them into the REMIC trusts that were supposed to be holding them.  This cavalier attitude toward document delivery is now coming home to roost.  While it may not have been a huge issue when loans were being paid off, it did become a huge issue when loans fell into default.

    So should the Big Banks make good on their threat to start filing judicial foreclosures in Oregon, defense attorneys will likely shift their sights away from the unrecorded Trust Deed Assignments[5], and focus instead on whether the lenders and servicers actually have the legal right to enforce the underlying Promissory Notes.


    [1] The word “indorsement” is UCC-speak for “endorsement” – as in “endorsing a check” in order to cash it.

    [2] Although not perhaps as apparent in the opinion as it could have been, there were not successive indorsements of the Veals’ Promissory Note, i.e. from the originating bank to the foreclosing bank. There was only one, i.e. from GSF to Option One.  There was no evidence that the Note, or the right to enforce it, had been transferred to Wells Fargo or AHMSI.  Ultimately, there was no legal entitlement under the UCC giving either Wells or its servicer, AHMSI, the ability to enforce that Note.  The principle here is that owning a borrower’s Trust Deed or Mortgage is insufficient without also owning, or have a right to enforce, the Promissory Note that it secures.

    [3] Mr. Dorchuck did not appear to testify.  His letter, on its face, is clearly hearsay and inadmissible.  The failure to properly lay any foundation for the letter, or authenticate it “under penalty of perjury” is inexplicable – one that the bankruptcy panel criticized. This was not the only example of poor evidentiary protocol followed by the banks in this case.  However, this may not be the fault of the banks’ lawyers. It is entirely possible these were the documents they had to work with, and they declined to certify under “penalty of perjury” the authenticity of them. If that is the case, one wonders how long good attorneys will continue to work for bad banks?

    [4] This is a drafting sleight of hand.  Mortgages and Trust Deeds are transferred by “assignment” from one entity to another. But Promissory Notes must be transferred under an entirely different set of rules – the UCC. Thus, to transfer both the Note and Mortgage by a simple “Assignment” document, is facially insufficient, by itself, to transfer ownership of – or a right to enforce – the Promissory Note.

    [5] The successive recording requirement of ORS 86.735(1) only applies when the lender is seeking to foreclose non-judicially.  Judicial foreclosures do not contain that statutory requirement.  However, to judicially foreclose, lenders will still have to establish that they meet the standing and real party interest requirements of the law.  In short, they will have to deal head-on with the requirements of Articles 3 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  The Veal case is a good primer on these issues.

    Phil Querin
    Attorney at Law
    http://www.q-law.com/
    121 SW Salmon Street, Suite 1100 Portland, OR 97204 
    Tel: (503) 471- 1334