Tag: Fannie Mae

  • The Meat of the Matter – In Re: Veal Analyzed, by Phil Querin, Q-Law.com


     

    “When a note is split from a deed of trust ‘the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.’ *** Additionally, if the deed of trust was assigned without the note, then the assignee, ‘having no interest in the underlying debt or obligation, has a worthless piece of paper.’” [In re Veal – United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (June 10, 2011)]

    Introduction. This case is significant for two reasons: First, it was heard and decided by a three-judge Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit, which includes Oregon.  Second, it represents the next battleground in the continuing foreclosure wars between Big Banks and Bantam Borrowers: The effect of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC”)on the transferability of the Promissory Note (or “Note”).

    Remember, the Trust Deed follows the Note.  If a lender is the owner of a Trust Deed, but cannot produce the actual Note which it secures, the Trust Deed is useless, since the lender is unable to prove it is owed the debt.  Conversely, if the lender owns the Note, but not the Trust Deed, it cannot foreclose the secured property. [For a poetic perspective on the peripatetic lives of a Note and Trust Deed, connect here. – PCQ]

    By now, most observers are aware that Oregon’s mandatory recording statute, ORS 86.735(1), has been a major impediment to lenders and servicers seeking trying to foreclose borrowers.  Two major Oregon cases, the first in federal bankruptcy court, In re McCoy, and the other, in federal district trial court, Hooker v. Bank of America, et. al, based their decisions to halt the banks’ foreclosures, squarely on the lenders’ failure to record all Trust Deed Assignments.  To date, however, scant mention has been made in these cases about ownership of the Promissory Note. [Presumably, this is because a clear violation of the Oregon’s recording statute is much easier to pitch to a judge, than having to explain the nuances – and there are many – of Articles 3 and 9 of the UCC.  – PCQ]

    Now we have In re: Veal, which was an appeal from the bankruptcy trial judge’s order granting Wells Fargo relief from the automatic stay provisions under federal bankruptcy law.   Such a ruling meant that Wells Fargo would be permitted to foreclose the Veals’ property.  But since this case arose in Arizona – not Oregon – our statutory law requiring the recording of all Assignments as a prerequisite to foreclosure, did not apply.  Instead, the Veals’ lawyer relied upon the banks’ failure to establish that it had any right under the UCC to enforce the Promissory Note.

    Legal Background. For reasons that do not need to be explained here, the Veals filed two contemporaneous appeals. One was against Wells Fargo Bank, which was acting as the Trustee for a REMIC, Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006–3, Asset–Backed Certificates Series 2006–3.  In the second appeal, the Veals challenged the bankruptcy court’s order overruling their objection to a proof of claim filed by Wells Fargo’s servicing agent, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“AHMSI”).

    Factual Background. In August 2006, the Veals executed a Promissory Note and Mortgage in favor of GSF Mortgage Corporation (“GSF”). On June 29, 2009, they filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  On July 18, 2009, AHMSI filed a proof of claim, on behalf of Wells Fargo as its servicing agent.  AHMSI included with its proof of claim the following documents:

    • A copy of the Note, showing an indorsement[1] from GSF to “Option One”[2];
    • A copy of the GSF’s Mortgage with the Veals;
    • A copy of a recorded “Assignment of Mortgage” assigning the Mortgage from GSF to Option One; and,
    • A letter dated May 15, 2008, signed by Jordan D. Dorchuck as Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer of AHMSI, addressed to “To Whom it May Concern”, stating that AHMSI acquired Option One’s mortgage servicing business.[3]

    The Veals argued that AHMSI [Wells’ servicing agent] lacked standing since neither AHMSI or Wells Fargo established that they were qualified holders of the Note under Arizona’s version of the UCC.

    In a belated and last ditch effort to establish its standing, Wells Fargo filed a copy of another Assignment of Mortgage, dated after it had already filed for relief from bankruptcy stay.  This Assignment purported to transfer to Wells Fargo the Mortgage held by “Sand Canyon Corporation formerly known as Option One Mortgage Corporation”.

    The 3-judge panel noted that neither of the assignments (the one from GSF to Option One and the other from Sand Canyon, Option One’s successor, to Wells) were authenticated – meaning that there were no supporting affidavits or other admissible evidence vouching for the authenticity of the documents.  In short, it again appears that none of the banks’ attorneys would swear that the copies were true and accurate reproductions of the original – or that they’d even seen the originals to compare them with.  With continuing reports of bogus and forged assignments, and robo-signed documents of questionable legal authority, it is not surprising that the bankruptcy panel viewed this so-called “evidence” with suspicion, and did not regard it as persuasive evidence.

    • As to the Assignment of Mortgage from GSF (the originating bank) to Option One, the panel noted that it purported to assign not only the Mortgage, but the Promissory Note as well.[4]
    • As to the Assignment of Mortgage from Sand Canyon [FKA Option One] to Wells Fargo[created after Wells Fargo’s motion for relied from stay], the panel said that the document did not contain language purporting to assign the Veals’ Promissory Note.  As a consequence[even had it been considered as evidence], it would not have provided any proof of the transfer of the Promissory Note to Wells Fargo. At most, it would only have been proof that the Mortgage had been assigned.

    After considerable discussion about the principles of standing versus real party in interest, the 3-judge panel focused on the latter, generally defining it as a rule protecting a defendant from being sued multiple times for the same obligation by different parties.

    Applicability of UCC Articles 3 and 9. The Veal opinion is well worth reading for a good discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code and its applicability to the transfer and enforcement of Promissory Notes.  The panel wrote that there are three ways to transfer Notes.  The most common method is for one to be the “holder” of the Note.  A person may be a “holder” if they:

    • Have possession of the Note and it has been made payable to them; or,
    • The Note is payable to the bearer [e.g. the note is left blank or payable to the “holder”.]
    • The third way to enforce the Note is by attaining the status of a “nonholder in possession of the [note] who has the rights of a holder.” To do so, “…the possessor of the note must demonstrate both the fact of the delivery and the purpose of the delivery of the note to the transferee in order to qualify as the “person entitled to enforce.”

    The panel concluded that none of Wells Fargo’s exhibits showed that it, or its agent, had actual possession of the Note.  Thus, it could not establish that it was a holder of the Note, or a “person entitled to enforce” it. The judges noted that:

    “In addition, even if admissible, the final purported assignment of the Mortgage was insufficient under Article 9 to support a conclusion that Wells Fargo holds any interest, ownership or otherwise, in the Note.  Put another way, without any evidence tending to show it was a “person entitled to enforce” the Note, or that it has an interest in the Note, Wells Fargo has shown no right to enforce the Mortgage securing the Note. Without these rights, Wells Fargo cannot make the threshold showing of a colorable claim to the Property that would give it prudential standing to seek stay relief or to qualify as a real party in interest.”

    As for Wells’ servicer, AHMSI, the panel reviewed the record and found nothing to establish that AHMSI was its lawful servicing agent.  AHMSI had presented no evidence as to who possessed the original Note.  It also presented no evidence showing indorsement of the Note either in its favor or in favor of Wells Fargo.  Without establishing these elements, AHMSI could not establish that it was a “person entitled to enforce” the Note.

    Quoting from the opinion:

    “When debtors such as the Veals challenge an alleged servicer’s standing to file a proof of claim regarding a note governed by Article 3 of the UCC, that servicer must show it has an agency relationship with a “person entitled to enforce” the note that is the basis of the claim. If it does not, then the servicer has not shown that it has standing to file the proof of claim. ***”

    Conclusion. Why is the Veal case important?  Let’s start with recent history: First, we know that during the securitization heydays of 2005 – 2007, record keeping and document retention were exceedingly lax.  Many in the lending and servicing industry seemed to think that somehow, MERS would reduce the paper chase.  However, MERS was not mandatory, and in any event, it captured at best, perhaps 60% of the lending industry.  Secondly, MERS tracked only Mortgages and Trust Deeds – not Promissory Notes.  So even if a lender can establish its ownership of the Trust Deed, that alone is not enough, without the Note, to permit the foreclosure.

    As recent litigation has revealed, some large lenders, such as Countrywide, made a habit of holding on to their Promissory Notes, rather than transferring them into the REMIC trusts that were supposed to be holding them.  This cavalier attitude toward document delivery is now coming home to roost.  While it may not have been a huge issue when loans were being paid off, it did become a huge issue when loans fell into default.

    So should the Big Banks make good on their threat to start filing judicial foreclosures in Oregon, defense attorneys will likely shift their sights away from the unrecorded Trust Deed Assignments[5], and focus instead on whether the lenders and servicers actually have the legal right to enforce the underlying Promissory Notes.


    [1] The word “indorsement” is UCC-speak for “endorsement” – as in “endorsing a check” in order to cash it.

    [2] Although not perhaps as apparent in the opinion as it could have been, there were not successive indorsements of the Veals’ Promissory Note, i.e. from the originating bank to the foreclosing bank. There was only one, i.e. from GSF to Option One.  There was no evidence that the Note, or the right to enforce it, had been transferred to Wells Fargo or AHMSI.  Ultimately, there was no legal entitlement under the UCC giving either Wells or its servicer, AHMSI, the ability to enforce that Note.  The principle here is that owning a borrower’s Trust Deed or Mortgage is insufficient without also owning, or have a right to enforce, the Promissory Note that it secures.

    [3] Mr. Dorchuck did not appear to testify.  His letter, on its face, is clearly hearsay and inadmissible.  The failure to properly lay any foundation for the letter, or authenticate it “under penalty of perjury” is inexplicable – one that the bankruptcy panel criticized. This was not the only example of poor evidentiary protocol followed by the banks in this case.  However, this may not be the fault of the banks’ lawyers. It is entirely possible these were the documents they had to work with, and they declined to certify under “penalty of perjury” the authenticity of them. If that is the case, one wonders how long good attorneys will continue to work for bad banks?

    [4] This is a drafting sleight of hand.  Mortgages and Trust Deeds are transferred by “assignment” from one entity to another. But Promissory Notes must be transferred under an entirely different set of rules – the UCC. Thus, to transfer both the Note and Mortgage by a simple “Assignment” document, is facially insufficient, by itself, to transfer ownership of – or a right to enforce – the Promissory Note.

    [5] The successive recording requirement of ORS 86.735(1) only applies when the lender is seeking to foreclose non-judicially.  Judicial foreclosures do not contain that statutory requirement.  However, to judicially foreclose, lenders will still have to establish that they meet the standing and real party interest requirements of the law.  In short, they will have to deal head-on with the requirements of Articles 3 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  The Veal case is a good primer on these issues.

    Phil Querin
    Attorney at Law
    http://www.q-law.com/
    121 SW Salmon Street, Suite 1100 Portland, OR 97204 
    Tel: (503) 471- 1334

  • Multnomahforeclosures.com: July 15th, 2011 Update.


    Multnomah County highlighted in Oregon; Portla...
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    Multnomahforeclosures.com was updated with the largest list of Notice Defaults to date. With Notice of Default records dating back nearly 3 years.  

    If you are planning on investing in real estate, want to learn the status of the home you are renting/leasing or about to rent or lease  you should visit Multnomahforeclosures.com.

    All listings are in PDF and Excel Spread Sheet format.

    Multnomah County Foreclosures

    Multnomah County Foreclosures
    http://multnomahforeclosures.com

     
     

    Fred Stewart 
    Broker
    Stewart Group Realty Inc.
    http://www.sgrealty.us/
    info@sgrealtyinc.com
    503-289-4970 (Phone)

  • PMI to pay underwater borrowers to stay put by by Jacob Gafney, Housingwire.com


    Private mortgage insurer PMI Group (PMI: 1.34 -11.26%) will offer cash incentives to some homeowners in negative equity to help prevent mortgage defaults.

    PMI subsidiary, Homeowner Reward is working with Loan Value Group, to administer the pilot program, called Responsible Homeowner Reward.

    The program launched Monday and will start in select real estate markets where falling house prices left borrowers owing significantly more on their mortgage than what the property is worth.

    Participation in RH Reward is voluntary and there is no cost to the homeowner, according to PMI. The cash will come after a lengthy period of keeping the mortgage current, generally from 36 to 60 months. According to PMI, the reward will be between 10 to 30% of the unpaid principal balance.

    The Loan Value Group works “to positively influence consumer behavior on behalf of residential mortgage owners and servicers,” according to its website.

    LVG programs already delivered more than $100 million in cash incentives to distressed homeowners. However, those programs focus on turnkey solutions such as cash for keys, with an aim to avoid principal forgiveness. The Homeowner Reward program is taking a different path.

    “We continue to seek creative and effective loss mitigation strategies,” said Chris Hovey, PMI vice president of servicing operations and loss management. “PMI is especially supportive of homeownership retention efforts in states that are facing unprecedented housing challenges.”

    Write to Jacob Gaffney.

    Follow him on Twitter @jacobgaffney.

  • Bend’s economy is coming back to life, By Ben Jacklet, Oregon Business Magazine


    Location of Central Oregon in Oregon based on ...
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    Shelly Hummel has been selling homes in Bend for more than 20 years, and she’s got the attitude to match: upbeat, confident, a dog-lover who took up skiing at age 4. She labors to keep things positive, but every so often her frustration slips free: “The banks just kept giving the builders money, without even looking at plans or doing drive-bys of the places they were selling. The market just exploded with new construction. Boom! Selling stuff off of floor plans. Unfortunately, selling them to people who had no business buying them. It was a perfect storm of stupidity.”

    We are touring the wreckage of that storm in Hummel’s Cadillac Escalade, driving down Brookswood Boulevard into a former pine forest that now hosts a swath of housing developments with names like Copper Canyon and Quail Pine. “This was the boundary line until 2003,” says Hummel. “These roads dead-ended. That home sold for $350,000. Now it’s on the market for $175,000. Short sale.”

    Hummel never intended to become a “certified distressed property expert” specializing in selling homes for less than is owed on their mortgages. But in Bend, she didn’t have much of a choice. No city in Oregon — or arguably, the nation — experienced a more dramatic reversal of fortunes during the Great Recession than Bend, the economic engine for Central Oregon. Home values got cut in half. Unemployment soared to over 16%. A once-promising aviation sector imploded. So did an overheated market for destination resorts. Brokers, builders and speculators once flush with cash woke up underwater and flailing. Banks renowned for their no-document, easy-money loans stopped lending. Layoffs led to notices of default; foreclosure brought bankruptcy.

    How does a community recover from economic meltdown? That is the central question I am trying to answer about Bend. I start my inquiry at the offices of Economic Development for Central Oregon (EDCO), an organization formed to diversify the economy after the last major recession in the region, in the 1980s. My meeting is with executive director Roger Lee, marketing manager Ruth Lindley and business development manager Eric Strobel. I turn on my digital recorder and say, “I’d like to hear your take on how the recession impacted Bend’s economy.”

    Silence. I read their expressions: Not this again.

    It takes some time, but over the course of the interview they paint a sharp portrait of what went wrong and why. A local housing boom “fueled by speculation, not solid economics,” in Lee’s words, crashed. The local crash coincided with a national housing slump that devastated Bend’s major traded sector of building supplies. The final blow was the collapse of the local general aviation industry. Cessna shut down its local plant in April 2009. Epic Aircraft, the other major employer at the airport, went bankrupt.

    “Aviation was our diversification away from construction and wood products,” says Strobel. “We had thousands of employees out at Bend Airport. It was the largest aviation cluster in the state… It just completely fell apart in six months.”

    Read more: Bend’s economy is coming back to life – Oregon Business http://www.oregonbusiness.com/articles/101-july-2011/5460-bends-economy-is-coming-back-to-life#ixzz1QVF66anh

     
  • Below Market Interest For Some Home Buyers Rate Available , by Brett Reichel, Brettreichel.com


    If an interest rate below 4% is appealing to you, you should consider the Oregon State Bond Loan as an option in your next home purchase.

     Yes – it can be used in a “next” situation.  Though the program is a first time home buyer program, there are options for previous home owners to use this program.  The Bond Loan defines a first time home buyer as someone who hasn’t owned a home in the last three years.  So, if you owned a home, but sold it prior to 2007, it’s possible that you could qualify for this loan.

    Currently, the State Bond Loan has an interest rate of 3.875%* and an APR of 4.721%*.  These low interest rates might be a once in a lifetime opportunity. 

    The program is underwritten to FHA guidelines so it’s a pretty easy program to qualify for.  FHA allows for less than perfect credit, and has flexible debt-to-income guidelines as well. 

     There are income limitations, but they are quite generous.  You should plan on being a long term owner due to the potential “recapture” tax penalty (which isn’t automatic, nor is it as bad as many loan officers make it out to be).

    Any “first time” home buyer should be considering this tool to minimize their housing expense!

    *Based on a $200,000 sales price and $194,930 loan amount.  Finance Charge $157,406.55, Amount Financed $190,935.08 and Total of Payments $348,341.73.  Credit on approval.  Terms subject to change without notice.  Not a commitment to lend.  Call for details.  Equal Housing Lender.

     

    Brett Reichel’s Blog  http://www.brettreichel.com

     

  • Home equity picture improves, a little, by Wendy Culverwell, Portland Business Journal


    The number of homes worth less than their outstanding mortgages fell slightly in the first three months, according to figures released Tuesday by CoreLogic Inc. (NYSE: CLGX), a Santa Ana, Calif.-based real estate data firm.

    According to CoreLogic, 27.2 percent — or 13.5 million homes — had negative or near-negative equity in the first quarter. That compares to 27.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2010.

    In Oregon, 17.2 percent of homes are worth less than their mortgages and another 5.8 percent had near-negative equity. Collectively, Oregonians owe $121.9 billion on 696,142 mortgages on properties worth a total of $175 billion.

    “The current economic indicators point to slow yet positive economic growth, which will slowly reduce the risk of borrowers experiencing income shocks,” said Mark Fleming, chief economist with CoreLogic. “Yet the existence of negative equity for the foreseeable future will weigh on the housing market recovery by holding back sale and refinance activity.”

    Negative equity occurs when a borrower owes more than the home is worth. “Near-negative” refers to homes with less than 5 percent equity, a figure that would be wiped out by transaction costs if the property were sold.

    In Washington state, 16.9 percent of homes had negative equity and 5.8 percent had near-negative equity. Collectively, Washingtonians owe $291.7 billion on 1,412,110 mortgages on properties worth a total of $429.1 billion.

    Nevada, where 63 percent of all mortgaged homes are worth less than the outstanding loan balance, led the nation for negative equity. The other top five states were Arizona, 50 percent, Florida, 46 percent, Michigan, 36 percent and California, 31 percent. Nevada, Arizona and Florida showed improvement from the prior quarter.

    The average “underwater” home is worth $65,000 less than the outstanding mortgage balance.

    Read more: Home equity picture improves, a little | Portland Business Journal

  • Use Caution When Selling REO Properties, by Phil Querin, PMAR Legal Counsel, Querin Law, LLC Q-Law.com


    Foreclosure Sign, Mortgage Crisis
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    By now, most Realtors® have heard the rumblings about defective bank foreclosures in Oregon and elsewhere. What you may not have heard is that these flawed foreclosures can result in potential title problems down the road. 

    Here’s the “Readers Digest” version of the issue: Several recent federal court cases in Oregon  have chastised lenders for failing to follow the trust deed foreclosure law. This law, found inORS 86.735(1), essentially says that before a lender may foreclose, it must record all assignments of the underlying trust deed. This requirement assures that the lender purporting to currently hold the note and trust deed can show the trail of assignments back to the original  bank that first made the loan.

    Due to poor record keeping, many banks cannot easily locate the several assignments that  occurred over the life of the trust deed. Since Oregon’s law only requires assignment as a condition to foreclosing, the reality of the requirement didn’t hit home until the foreclosure crisis was in full swing, i.e. 2008 and after.

    Being unable to now comply with the successive recording requirement, the statute was frequently ignored. The result was that most foreclosures in Oregon were potentially based upon a flawed process. One recent federal case held that the failure to record intervening assignments resulted in the foreclosure being “void.” In short, a complete nullity – as if it never occurred.

    Aware of this law, the Oregon title industry is considering inserting a limitation on the scope of its policy coverage in certain REO sales. The limitation would apply where the underlying foreclosure did not comply with the assignment recording requirement of ORS 86.735(1). This means that the purchaser of certain bank-owned homes may not get complete coverage under their owner’s title policy. Since many banks have not generally given any warranties in their

    REO deeds, there is a risk that a buyer will have no recourse (i.e. under their deed or their title insurance policy) should someone later attack the legality of the underlying foreclosure.

    Realtors® representing buyers of REO properties should keep this issue in mind. While this is  not to suggest that brokers become “title sleuths,” it is to suggest that they be generally aware of the issue, and mention it to their clients, when appropriate. If necessary, clients should be told to consult their own attorney. This is the “value proposition” that a well-informed Realtor®  brings to the table in all REO transactions.

    ©2011 Phillip C. Querin, QUERIN LAW, LLC

    Visit Phil Querin’s web site for more information about Oregon Real Estate Law http://www.q-law.com

  • The Fed Does It Again: $80 Billion Secretive “Bank Subsidy” Program Uncovered, Providing Bank Loans At 0.01% Interest, Tyler Durden, Zero Hedge Blog


    he Fed does it again. Following consistent allegations that the Federal Reserve operates in an opaque world, whose each and every action has only had a purpose of serving its Wall Street masters, led to repeated lawsuits which went so far as to get the Chairsatan to promise he would be more transparent, Bloomberg’s Bob Ivry breaks news that between March and December 2008 the Fed operated a previously undisclosed lending program, whose terms were nothing short of a subsidy to banks. Says Ivry: “The $80 billion initiative, called single-tranche open- market operations, or ST OMO, made 28-day loans from March through December 2008, a period in which confidence in global credit markets collapsed after the Sept. 15 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Units of 20 banks were required to bid at auctions for the cash. They paid interest rates as low as 0.01 percent that December, when the Fed’s main lending facility charged 0.5 percent.” 0.01% interest is also known by one other name: “outright subsidy.” It doesn’t get any freer than that: 0.01% interest on one month cash. Just how close to a complete implosion was the financial system if 0.5% interest seemed too high? Not surprisingly, this program was widely used: “Credit Suisse Group AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc each borrowed at least $30 billion in 2008 from a Federal Reserve emergency lending program whose details weren’t revealed to shareholders, members of Congress or the public…Goldman Sachs, led by Chief Executive Officer Lloyd C. Blankfein, tapped the program most in December 2008, when data on the New York Fed website show the loans were least expensive. The lowest winning bid at an ST OMO auction declined to 0.01 percent on Dec. 30, 2008, New York Fed data show. At the time, the rate charged at the discount window was 0.5 percent. “ Yes, that Goldman Sachs. The same one that perjured itself when it said before the FCIC that it only used de minimis emergency borrowings. Just how many more top secret taxpayer subsidies will emerge were being used by the Fed to keep the kleptocratic status quo in charge?
    From Buisnessweek:
    “This was a pure subsidy,” said Robert A. Eisenbeis, former head of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and now chief monetary economist at Sarasota, Florida-based Cumberland Advisors Inc. “The Fed hasn’t been forthcoming with disclosures overall. Why should this be any different?”
    Congress overlooked ST OMO when lawmakers required the central bank to publish its emergency lending data last year under the Dodd-Frank law.
    “I wasn’t aware of this program until now,” said U.S. Representative Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who chaired the House Financial Services Committee in 2008 and co- authored the legislation overhauling financial regulation. The law does require the Fed to release details of any open-market operations undertaken after July 2010, after a two-year lag.
    Records of the 2008 lending, released in March under court orders, show how the central bank adapted an existing tool for adjusting the U.S. money supply into an emergency source of cash. Zurich-based Credit Suisse borrowed as much as $45 billion, according to bar graphs that appear on 27 of 29,000 pages the central bank provided to media organizations that sued the Fed Board of Governors for public disclosure.
    New York-based Goldman Sachs’s borrowing peaked at about $30 billion, the records show, as did the program’s loans to RBS, based in Edinburgh. Deutsche Bank AG, Barclays Plc and UBS AG each borrowed at least $15 billion, according to the graphs, which reflect deals made by 12 of the 20 eligible banks during the last four months of 2008.
    And even now, we don’t know how much these individual subsidies were:
    The records don’t provide exact loan amounts for each bank. Smith, the New York Fed spokesman, would not disclose those details. Amounts cited in this article are estimates based on the graphs.

    Stock up with Fresh Food that lasts with eFoodsDirect (AD)

    The usual excuse is used: the purpose of the program was to prevent the Ice-6ing of shadow markets
    One effect of the program was to spur trading in mortgage- backed securities, said Lou Crandall, chief U.S. economist at Jersey City, New Jersey-based Wrightson ICAP LLC, a research company specializing in Fed operations. The 20 banks — previously designated as primary dealers to trade government securities directly with the New York Fed — posted mortgage securities guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in exchange for the Fed’s cash.
    ST OMO aimed to thaw a frozen short-term funding market and not necessarily to aid individual banks, Crandall said. Still, primary dealers earned spreads by using the program to help customers, such as hedge funds, finance their mortgage securities, he said.
    One name stands out: Goldman Sachs.
    The New York Fed conducted 44 ST OMO auctions, from March through December 2008, according to its website. Banks bid the interest rate they were willing to pay for the loans, which had terms of 28 days. That was an expansion of longstanding open- market operations, which offered cash for up to two weeks.
    Outstanding ST OMO loans from April 2008 to January 2009 stayed at $80 billion. The average loan amount during that time was $19.4 billion, more than three times the average for the 7 1/2 years prior, according to New York Fed data. By comparison, borrowing from the Fed’s discount window, its main lending program for banks since 1914, peaked at $113.7 billion in October 2008, Fed data show.
    Goldman Sachs, led by Chief Executive Officer Lloyd C. Blankfein, tapped the program most in December 2008, when data on the New York Fed website show the loans were least expensive. The lowest winning bid at an ST OMO auction declined to 0.01 percent on Dec. 30, 2008, New York Fed data show. At the time, the rate charged at the discount window was 0.5 percent.
    More on Goldman:
    As its ST OMO loans peaked in December 2008, Goldman Sachs’s borrowing from other Fed facilities topped out at $43.5 billion, the 15th highest peak of all banks assisted by the Fed, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That month, the bank’s Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities trading unit lost $320 million, according to a May 6, 2009, regulatory filing.
    The source of the data: a FOIA lawsuit, just because the plebs knowing where billions of their money goes is not really in the best interests of the lords.
    The bar charts were included in the Fed’s court-ordered March 31 disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. The release was mandated after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an industry group’s attempt to block it
    So there it is again: a secret bailout program used to “rape” the peasantry by the entitled kleptocrats, which nobody thought would be exposed, and would allow those in control to lie blatantly to Congress. But have no fear: the wheels of justice are turning: instead of having those who rape millions under house arrest, we get the spectacle of those who allegedly rape one. The former, after all, are just a statistic.
    And how long before the peasantry just snaps from the barage of endless lies?

  • Fannie Mae Homepath Review, by Thetruthaboutmortgage.com


    Government mortgage financier Fannie Mae offers special home loan financing via its “HomePath” program, so let’s take a closer look.

    In short, a HomePath mortgage allows prospective homebuyers to get their hands on a Fannie Mae-owned property (foreclosure) for as little down as three percent down.

    And that down payment can be in the form of a gift, a grant, or a loan from a nonprofit organization, state or local government, or an employer.

    This compares to the minimum 3.5 percent down payment required with an FHA loan.

    HomePath financing comes in the form of fixed mortgages, adjustable-rate mortgages, and even interest-only options!

    Another big plus associated with HomePath financing is that there is no lender-required appraisal or mortgage insurance.

    Typically, private mortgage insurance is required for mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio over 80 percent, so this is a pretty good deal.

    HomePath® Buyer Incentive

    Fannie Mae is also currently offering buyers up to 3.5 percent in closing cost assistance through June 30, 2011.

    But only those who plan to use the property as their primary residence as eligible – second homes and investment properties are excluded.

    Finally, many condominium projects don’t meet Fannie’s guidelines, but if the condo you’re interested in is owned by Fannie Mae, it may be available for financing via HomePath.

    Note that most large mortgage lenders, such as Citi or Wells Fargo, are “HomePath Mortgage Lenders,” meaning they can offer you the loan program.

    Additionally, some of these lenders work with mortgage brokers, so you can go that route as well.

    Final Word

    In summary, HomePath might be a good alternative to purchasing a foreclosure through the open market.

    And with flexible down payment requirements and no mortgage insurance or lender-required appraisal, you could save some serious cash.

    So HomePath properties and corresponding financing should certainly be considered alongside other options.

    But similar to other foreclosures, these homes are sold as-is, meaning repairs may be needed, which you will be responsible for. So tread cautiously.

  • Don’t Be Fooled Again! by Brett Reichel, Brettreichel.com


    Many people will tell you that an Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM)  is horrible, and something a borrower should never take out.  A friend recently stopped by worried that his ARM was adjusting and that his payment would go through the roof.  We analyzed his paperwork and found out that his interest rate would be going down by MORE THAN 2 PERCENT!  This made a big impact on his payment!

    The ARM’s that were bad were:

    • Sub Prime loans where the rate was artificially low
    • Had super short introductory periods like two years or less
    • Had a pre-payment penalty that was in force longer than the first adjustment of the loan
    • Had a payment that didn’t even cover their interest

    These loans were definitely toxic.

    The difference between today’s ARM’s?  Today’s ARM’s are much safer and better loans.  If you think you are only going to be in a property for 5, 7 or 10 years, you can find an ARM that has a fixed rate time frame that matches!   Here are features to look for in an ARM:

    • A fixed rate period that is the same or longer than the time frame you are planning on staying in the house.  If you think you’ll be there for five years, get a 5 year fixed ARM, or a 7 year fixed ARM.
    • Caps or limits to how high the interest rate a go to both at each adjustment and for the life of the loan.
    • Low margins.  What’s a margin?  Essentially, it’s the lenders “mark up” over the cost of their funds.  The lower the margin, the lower your future interest rate.
    • Most importantly, a lower rate than a 30 year fixed rate loan.  If you are sharing the interest rate risk with the lender, you should get a break in your costs.

     Recent customers of mine who are moving to a new town for just five years, will be saving over 1% in interest rate compared to the thirty year fixed rate loan.  For them this means about $100 per month!  For $100 a month, they can buy their loan officer a steak dinner every month for getting them such a good deal!

    Don’t be fooled by so-called experts.  ARMS are a great deal IF MATCHED to the correct situation.  Thirty year fixed rate loans are great, but sometimes an ARM is a better option.

  • Strategic Default: Inconceivable Assumptions Suddenly Conceivable, by Tim Rood, Mortgagenewsdaily.com


    Until recently it was generally believed that only a small fraction of Americans would willingly choose to skip their monthly mortgage payment, aka “strategically default”, when they found themselves stuck in a negative equity situation.

    The logic driving this belief was based on the notion that borrowers wouldn’t want to damage their credit profile or deal with the social stigma surrounding a public foreclosure. The assumption that most underwater borrowers will continue making their monthly payments (absent a life event) is factored into the analytics of risk managers, buyers and sellers of mortgage related assets, servicing managers, and regulators across the country.

    What if this assumption is wrong? Is that inconceivable?

    It wasn’t long ago when conventional wisdom convinced us that lenders would never make loans to borrowers that had virtually zero likelihood of being able to pay the loans back. In a 2010 study conducted by the Cato Institute, it was estimated that there were over 27 million Alt-A and subprime loans in the system by mid-2008. That’s approximately 50 percent of all loans in the market.  Remember when we thought home price would never fall on a national level? Never been done and won’t ever happen, right? That assumption was shattered when home values nationally dropped between 30-50% from their peak in 2006, wiping out roughly $7 trillion of home equity in the process.

    Fannie Mae recently published it’s latest National Housing Survey and exposed disturbing patterns and sentiments with American homeowners. For example,  46% of borrowers are “stressed” about their underwater mortgage, up from 11% in June 2010. That’s an alarming four-fold increase in three quarters. That statistic becomes even more concerning when viewing the sheer number of borrowers faced with negative equity. At the end of 2010, which doesn’t include the home price declines seen in 2011, CoreLogic estimated that 11.1 million homes, or 23.1 percent of all homes with a mortgage, were underwater. Think about those two stats this way – every morning, 46% of the estimated 11.1 million underwater borrowers wake up and debate why they should keep paying their monthly mortgage payment. Further weighing on borrowers is that  47% of borrowers surveyed reported higher household expenses than the year before…

    From that perspective, it doesn’t seem inconceivable that our assumptions might be off base again. Is principal forgiveness the answer?

    Probably not, and here’s why. Remember how many folks HAMP was supposed to save by giving them new loan terms? The number touted by the administration was over 4 million. In reality, the number is likely to come in around 500-750,000 permanent modifications. Imagine the scenario when a government sponsored principal reduction program is announced. Out of the 11 million underwater borrowers – you’ll probably get three times as many borrowers applying for relief. Maybe one tenth of them will actually qualify and be granted a principal reduction. In the meantime, some 20+ million applicants would have stopped making payments to “qualify” or be considered for qualification. How many of them will be able to or even want to get current again after they are turned down?

    Like it or not, we have got to find ways to stabilize home prices, reward responsible behavior among existing homeowners, and encourage home buying. I don’t see any ideas on the table that would accomplish any of these objectives…. and the effects are starting to show up in data.

  • Did you order the appraisal yet? – The Ideal Home Loan Process


    Awhile ago I produced a video about some conversations between certain Realtors and my team.

    I also wrote a nice long post about the subject, and Realtor professionalism in general, on my site.

    I like to go back and watch the video from time to time because it makes me laugh, and that is a rare commodity in today’s Real Estate market. While I was watching it, I thought I would share with the audience here what I consider to be the ideal home loan process, and exactly how the appraisal fits in to that timeline.

    1) Pre-application Consultation – Ideally, home loan applicants would sit down with a competent, licensed Mortgage Professional 6 months before they intend to enter the market. Many people have unique circumstances regarding credit, income, employment, etc., and 6 months is usually enough time to work through issues to present the best possible loan file to underwriting.

    2) Gathering of Essentials – Before you apply, you should gather your last 30 days paystubs, 2 most recent bank statements, last 2 years Federal tax returns with w2s & 1099s, & most recent retirement statements. And, if applicable, any divorce decrees, award letters, child support orders, and last 2 years business tax returns for self-employed/business owners.

    3) Fill out a Loan Application – When it’s time to fill out a loan application, do so with somebody you trust and get along with. You will be speaking with your loan officer a lot over the course of the coming weeks, so you might as well make sure that those conversations are with somebody you like and who is professional. They should clearly explain your loan terms, and all of the disclosures that need your signature so that you feel comfortable with the agreement you are entering into.

    4) Behind the Scenes – This is where the real work starts. Your Loan Officer and his/her team will be verifying and documenting your income and assets, dissecting your credit report, pre-approving you through automated underwriting, ordering a preliminary title report and title insurance, and many other things that are just as exciting as they sound, but necessary. This prepares your file to be ideally what we call a “one touch” file in…

    5) Underwriting – Despite the possibility of unexpected snafus, underwriting can still be a fairly smooth process if you have chosen the right Loan Officer to work with. Depending on underwriting turntimes, in a couple of days you should have a conditional approval. Think of this as the “to-do” list that you and your Loan Officer must complete before your loan documents can be drawn up.

    6) Conditions – You will work with your Loan Officer to get all of the “to-dos” done and submitted to the underwriter. Once you are sure that all conditions can be satisfied, this is when you would order the…

    7) APPRAISAL! – Your Loan Officer will order your appraisal through an Appraisal Management Company. Depending on the company used, and the demand for appraisals, this process will take a few days to a week. It has to be completed within 10 days, but it usually doesn’t take that long. Assuming the appraisal comes in at an acceptable value, the next step is to order the…

    8 ) DOCS! HOORAY!! – The docs, or loan documents, are the paperwork you sign at closing. These include the final application, disclosures, the note, and sometimes your last 2 years tax returns need to be signed (if you e-filed the previous 2 years). Next step is…

    9) FUNDING!!! – There will be some “prior-to-funding” conditions, but most of the time its standard escrow items. The escrow company sends all of the documents you signed at closing to the lender, and the lender reviews those documents for accuracy and completeness. If everything is ship-shape (which it should be if you are working with the right people), then you can…

    10) MOVE IN!!!!! – Time to pay for pizza and beer in an attempt to trick your friends into helping you move.

    And there you have it, the ideal home loan process. Each individual loan carries its own set of circumstances, so it isn’t out of the realm of possibility that your process might deviate from these 10 steps. However, if you select the right person to work with, you should have a good idea of what you are up against from the beginning.

    Jason Hillard - @homeloan_ninja
    Jason Hillard

    If you have any questions about Real Estate financing in Oregon or Washington, or the home loan process in general, feel free to shoot me an email at obi-wan_shinobi@homeloanninjas.com or check out the wealth of information at http://www.homeloanninjas.com/! I started the site because I continue to be appalled by the complete lack of reliable information about home loans in the mainstream media. I sincerely hope it is a true resource that helps to educate everyone to become a better home loan consumer.

  • Fannie vs. Freddie Earnings; Loan Limit Reduction Ahead; Jumbo Market Chatter; Think Tank Opinion on GSEs, by Rob Chrisman. Mortgage News Daily


    Yesterday I went through denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance – which are now the 5 stages of buying gas.

    Incidents of mortgage fraud dropped from 2009 to 2010. Either that, or incidents rose – it depends who you ask. FRAUD. Regardless, Florida took the “top” honors, followed by New York, California, New Jersey, and Maryland (No. 5).

    The FDIC’s chairman Sheila Bair will indeed be stepping down when her term expires, as has previously been announced. Cake and soda pop will be served in the FDIC’s cafeteria on July 8th – no gifts please.

    Fannie & Freddie recently released results that appear to point to the different focus in the past of their two companies. One reader wrote, “Freddie Mac reported its first true net profit in almost two years, earning $676 million in the first quarter and not asking the taxpayer for more money. But Fannie reported at $6.5 billion loss for the quarter, and asked Treasury for $8.5 billion in taxpayer money. From my vantage point, the difference rests in the amount of Countrywide business that Fannie bought in the past – CW was Fannie’s best customer for several years, selling Fannie a variety of A-paper, alt-A, pay option ARMs, and other products. I bet that if you take Countrywide out of the equation, Fannie would show similar results to Freddie. But last year Fannie agreed to one lump sum from BofA to settle the bulk of buyback claims – good for BofA, bad for Fannie.”

    Last month the Cato Institute published its opinion of the agencies, and it is making the rounds. “Foremost among the government-sponsored enterprises’ deleterious activities was their vast direct purchases of loans that can only be characterized as subprime. Under reasonable definitions of subprime, almost 30 percent of Fannie and Freddie direct purchases could be considered subprime. The government-sponsored enterprises were also the largest single investor in subprime private label mortgage-backed securities. During the height of the housing bubble, almost 40 percent of newly issued private-label subprime securities were purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In order to protect both the taxpayer and our broader economy, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be abolished, along with other policies that transfer the risk of mortgage default from the lender to the taxpayer.”

    Who is going to teach your staff about NMLS? Be sure to scroll down a little for news on NMLS and Federally regulated institutions! NMLSTraining

    For any jumbo mortgage fans, here is some chatter: Jumbo

    By the way, at this point the conforming loan level in the higher-priced areas will indeed drop to $625,500 from $729,750. Although it is not set in stone and could be subject to some political wrangling, few doubt that it will drop. Here is Fannie’s memo stating the loan limits Fannie along with the FHFA’s.

    Aventur Partners & Aventur Mortgage Capital appear to be turning some heads in the jumbo world. Led by the former co-founder and CEO of Thornburg Mortgage (Larry Goldstone) is developing a new mortgage company specializing in jumbo lending. Past and current legal nightmares aside, Thornburg-style companies certainly have their fans in the business, and the former vice president of Thornburg, David Akre, is the serving COO at Aventur.

    “Soldiers do not march in step when going across bridges because they could set up a vibration which could be sufficient to knock the bridge down.” Fortunately not every housing market moves in exactly the same direction and in the same magnitude, but Zillow posted some housing numbers that certainly would make a bridge shake a little. There seem to be dozens of house price indices, but the one from Zillow yesterday showed that home values posted the largest decline in the first quarter since late 2008. Home values fell 3% in the first quarter from the previous quarter and 1.1% in March from the previous month, and Zillow reports prices have now fallen for 57 consecutive months. Our economy needs job & housing, housing and jobs, to truly recover, and although mortgage rates continue to be low, the expiration of the housing tax credit and the continued flow of foreclosures hitting the market aren’t helping prices. Detroit, Chicago and Minneapolis posted the largest declines during the first quarter of the top 25 metro areas tracked by Zillow, while Pittsburgh, Dallas and Washington posted the smallest declines.

    As an interesting side note to this, housing is certainly more affordable than any time in a few decades, but credit, appraisal, and documentation standards remain tight (many would say they should, and if they were in place 5 years ago we wouldn’t have these issues). One report mentioned that the average credit score on loans backed by Fannie Mae stood at 762 in the first quarter, up from an average of 718 between 2001-2004.

    Franklin American relaxed its conventional condominium guidelines to allow established condominiums with 200 units or more to be approved through DU Limited Review or CPM. FAMC also tweaked its policies for “Purchase of a short sale/foreclosure or REO – Appraisal Requirements” (added the requirement for a full appraisal if the borrower is purchasing a property sold under a short sale in addition to transactions where the borrower is purchasing a foreclosure or REO), required that utilities must be on at time of appraiser’s inspection, and revised the income documentation guidelines for borrowers employed by an interested party to require a written VOE in addition to the most recent 30 day paystub. FAMC announced the introduction of the Conforming Fixed Rate 97 product which allows loans up to 97% through DU, with certain restrictions.

    GMAC Bank Correspondent Funding, echoing FHA Mortgage Letter 2011-11 on the subject of Refinance Transactions, refined its stance on the use of FHA TOTAL Scorecard to underwrite Credit Qualifying Streamlines (will continue to be eligible) and determining the mortgage basis on a Cash-out transaction when a borrower is buying out ground rent. GMAC also reminded clients that the Freddie Mac Relief Refinance Open Access product has been discontinued, and after tomorrow several of its loan program codes will no longer be available. GMACB will not purchase loans where LP feedback states Open Access.

    Wells’ wholesale notified brokers about changes to its “Compensation and Anti-Steering: BYTE Fee Details Now Accepted, Compensation and Anti-Steering: Appraisal Fee Reimbursement, and Best Practices to Avoid FHA Case Number Cancellation. WF’s broker clients were also reminded not to delay in learning about the NMLS Federal Registration*, given a new address for the “Change of Servicer” notifications, updated the processing fee for Guaranteed Rural Housing loans and curing TIL material disclosure errors, and reminded of the final documentation delivery address for VA loan Guaranty Certificates and Rural Development Loan

    Note Guarantees.

    *Three months ago the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Farm Credit Administration, FDIC, National Credit Union Administration, OCC, and OTS announced the opening of the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and Registry for Federally Regulated originators. “All originators (company and loan level) who are federally regulated will have 180 days to complete the SAFE Act requirements and register with the federal S.A.F.E. registry. One should not delay, as at the end of July all federally regulated originators will be required to provide their NMLS Loan Originator and LO Company ID’s: FederalNMLS

    Out in California, First California Mortgage is looking for someone to lead its new Multi-Family division. The person will be handling the full range of processing and monitoring activities associated with the multi-family housing program, along with cultivating new and enhancing established relationships with realtors, builders, community groups/clubs and associates resulting in new loan originations and referrals. In addition, the person will be securing new Agency lending opportunities, working primarily with Freddie and Fannie. (The complete list of duties and requirements is too lengthy for this commentary.) If you’re interested, or know someone who is, contact Shannon Thomson, Director of Human Resources, at sthomson@firstcal.net.

    Parkside Lending, a west coast wholesaler, reminded its brokers that it will fund Non-owner high balance purchase loans up to 80% LTV up to $625,500 through its Freddie Mac Super Conforming product line and subject to other restrictions. Parkside also allows broker/owners to select individual compensation plans for each of their branch offices. “This means one branch could be at 1.0% monthly comp contract while another is at 1.5% monthly comp -and so on, as long as they are under separate branches as recognized by DRE.”

    Wall Street continues to see good interest by investors in mortgage products, “…buying from all investor types…Japanese, Real Money and Central Banks have been the largest – the market continues to under estimate the short base…,” which is another way of saying that Central Banks and investment firms have an enormous amount of cash to be put to work. And specifically for mortgages, banks have been very large buyers of MBS (per the H8 data). Monday was very quiet, with the 10-yr yield closing at 3.14% and MBS prices a shade better/higher as there is still a flight to safety bid on continued worries about European debt issues – particularly related to Greece.

    Just before the funeral services, the undertaker came up to the very elderly widow and asked, “How old was your husband?”

    “98,” she replied. “Two years older than me.”

    “So you’re 96,” the undertaker commented.

    She responded, “Hardly worth going home, isn’t it?”

    Reporters interviewing a 104-year-old woman:

    “And what do you think is the best thing about being 104?” the reporter asked.

    She simply replied, “No peer pressure.”

    I’m happy to announce that I will be writing a twice-a-month blog that you can access at the STRATMOR Group web site located at http://www.stratmorgroup.com. Each blog will address what I regard as an important topic or issue for our industry. My first blog, for example, considers the near and longer-term outlook for jumbo lending. Since you can comment on my blogs, I’m hoping each topic I address will generate a thoughtful dialogue.

    Mortgage News Daily

    http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com

  • Report: Residential market hits double dip, by Wendy Culverwell, Portland Business Journal


    The U.S. residential real estate market experienced a dreaded “double dip” in April, according to Clear Capital, as a leading index dropped below the prior, post-recession market low set in March 2009.
    Truckee, Calif.-based Clear Capital monitors the residential real estate market. It found that nationwide home prices dropped 5 percent in April compared to one year ago and are down 11.5 percent over the prior nine months, a rate of decline not seen since 2008.
    Clear Capital’s Home Data Index for Portland dropped 10.1 percent compared to a year ago while Seattle prices dropped 12 percent in the same period.
    Clear Capital also said distressed properties, including foreclosures, represented 34.5 percent of the market in April.
    Locally, distressed properties represented 31.1 percent of the Portland market and 27.4 percent of the Seattle market, it said.
    “The latest data through April shows a continued increase in the proportion of distressed sales that are taking hold in markets nationwide,” said Alex Villacorta, director of research and analytics. “With more than one-third of national home sales being (distressed), market prices are being weighed down as many markets have not regained enough footing to withstand the strain.”
    Clear Data said the nation’s five best markets are Charlotte, N.C., Washington D.C., Tucson, Ariz., Dallas and Philadelphia.
    The five worst markets were Detroit, Hartford, Conn., Milwaukee, Wisc., Cleveland and Chicago.

    Read more: Report: Residential market hits double dip | Portland Business Journal
    http://www.bizjournals.com/portland

    Wendy Culverwell
    wculverwell@bizjournals.com

  • The Median Price Fallacy, by Brett Reichel, Brettreichel.com


    Every month or so, the news media generates articles based on the latest statistics from various multiple listing services. In those articles they relate how “Median Prices” have either fallen or increased. What’s that mean? Well, a median price is one where it’s the middle price of all the sales in an area. So, let’s say we have a small city called Brettville. In Brettville last month, there were 15 sales. One sale was at $200,000, 7 were above $200,000 and 7 were below $200,000. Then the middle price, or median price for Brettville last month was $200,000.

    Market analysts watch median prices for changes, and use them as an indicator of market price changes. However, median prices are not a good and clear indicator of an individual houses value, despite what most appraisal reports say today. In fact, when an appraiser uses changes in median prices as a justification for time adjustments to value, it is inaccurate analysis.

    What’s a time adjustment? An appraiser uses comparable sales (comps) to determine their opinion of value on the property they are appraising. The appraiser makes dollar value adjustments on these sales when they compare them to the subject property . A “comp” might be 200 square feet bigger than the subject so the appraiser would adjust for that difference. One thing appraisers do commonly in today’s market is adjust for the difference in time between when a “comp” sold and the date of the appraisal. If a market is appreciating or depreciating at 1% a month, the appraiser would make an adjustment to the value of the comp in comparison to the subject to compensate for the difference in time.

    It’s inaccurate analysis to use median price to justify this time adjustment. Why? Because median price could be affected by more cheap houses selling in an area or more expensive houses selling in a neighborhood. It could have zero to do with any change in value.

    Another factor that makes median prices not appropriate for time adjustments is that different market value ranges could have different changes in value. In some of the markets, larger, move up style homes are depreciating faster than starter homes. Why? Because there are more first time home buyers in the market than move up buyers.

    If you are not happy with your appraisal, review it, and read the comments. If the appraiser justifies the time adjustment with median prices, and not a matched pair analysis, you have a faulty appraisal, and valid grounds for a complaint. Don’t expect your lender to do this, your loan officer doesn’t understand, and the underwriter probably doesn’t either. But the appraiser knows what they are doing. They used to laugh at Realtors for doing this in an appreciating market. Now they’ve jumped on that bandwagon, too.

    For More of Brett’s writing. Go to http://brettreichel.com

  • Report Reveals Racial Disparities in Mortgage Lending, Posted in Financial News, Mortgage Rates, Refinance


    Funds used for refinancing home mortgages were less available in the minority sections of major U.S. cities than in predominantly white areas after the recent housing crash, according to a new study released on Thursday. The study, compiled by a coalition of nonprofit groups across the country, revealed that refinancing in minority areas has decreased since the recession.

    Mortgage Refinancing Drops 17 Percent in Minority Areas

    The report, titled “Paying More for the American Dream V,” took a look at seven metropolitan areas–Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New York City and Rochester, N.Y.–to explore conventional mortgage refinancing.

    The study, compiled by groups like California Reinvestment, the Woodstock Institute in Chicago and the Ohio Fair Lending Coalition, revealed the following:

    • Refinancing in minority areas decreased by an average of 17 percent in 2009 compared with the year prior.
    • Refinancing in white areas jumped by 129 percent.
    • Lenders “were more than twice as likely” to deny applications for refinancing by borrowers living in minority communities than in majority white neighborhoods.

    The report also found that minority borrowers were more likely to obtain a high-risk subprime mortgage loan than white borrowers, even if their credit was good.

    Lenders Urged to Invest More in Low-Income Communities

    Because of the inconsistency the study’s authors found in lending practices, they are concerned that there are ongoing racial disparities in mortgage lending as a whole.

    Adam Rust, Director of Research at the Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina, noted in statement “Lenders are loosening up credit in predominantly white neighborhoods, while continuing to deprive communities of color of vital refinancing needed to aid in their economic recovery.”

    To aid the issue, the authors are urging lenders to make changes, including:

    • Investing more in low-income communities
    • Improving disclosure requirements to protect unwary borrowers

    They noted that it is subprime loans that contributed largely to the housing market crash because not only were they given to those with poor credit, but income was never checked to confirm that borrowers could repay the balance.

    With foreclosures expected to flow heavily in the months to come and home sales still struggling, the authors believe that expanding fair lending opportunities to all who qualify could help repair the housing industry. It’s for this reason they think changes to lending practices should be a top priority for financial institutions.

  • Strategic Defaults Revisited: This Could Get Very Ugly, by Keith Jurow, Minyanville.com


    In an article posted on Minyanville last September — Strategic Defaults Threaten All Major US Housing Markets — I discussed the growing threat that so-called “strategic defaults” posed to major metros which had experienced a housing bubble. With home prices showing renewed weakness again, now is a good time to revisit this important issue.

    What Is Meant By Strategic Default?

    According to Wikipedia, a strategic default is “the decision by a borrower to stop making payments (i.e., default) on a debt despite having the financial ability to make the payments.” This definition has become the commonly accepted view.

    I define a strategic defaulter to be any borrower who goes from never having missed a payment directly into a 90-day default. A good graph which I will discuss shortly illustrates my definition.

    Who Walks Away from Their Mortgage?

    When home prices were rising rapidly during the bubble years of 2003-2006, it was almost inconceivable that a homeowner would voluntarily stop making payments on the mortgage and lapse into default while having the financial means to remain current on the loan.

    Then something happened which changed everything. Prices in most bubble metros leveled off in early 2006 before starting to decline. With certain exceptions, home prices have been falling quite steadily since then around the country. In recent memory, this was something totally new and it has radically altered how most homeowners view their house.

    In those major metros where prices soared the most during the housing bubble, homeowners who have strategically defaulted share three essential assumptions: 

    • The value of their home would not recover to their original purchase price for quite a few years.
    • They could rent a house similar to theirs for considerably less than what they were paying on the mortgage.
    • They could sock away tens of thousands of dollars by stopping mortgage payments before the lender finally got around to foreclosing.

    Put yourself into the mind and shoes of an underwater homeowner who held these three assumptions. Can you see how the temptation to default might be difficult to resist?

    Who Does Not Walk Away?

    Most underwater homeowners continue to pay their mortgage. An article posted online in early February by USA Today discusses the dilemma faced by underwater homeowners in Merced, California, a city which has suffered one of the steepest collapses in home prices since their bubble burst in 2006.

    The author cites the situation of one couple who had bought their home in 2006 for $241,000. They doubted it would bring more than $140,000 today. The husband considered the idea of looking for a better job in another state. But that meant selling the house for a huge loss or giving the house back to the bank and walking away. They refused to do that. The reason was simple in their mind. They made an agreement when they took out the mortgage.

    The same explanation was given by another couple in their 50s who owe $375,000 on their loan and believe it would not sell for more than $150,000. They both work and can afford the mortgage payment. They are very attached to their home and feel a moral obligation to pay the mortgage. Yet they know that many others have walked away. Because they refuse to bail out of their loan, they concede that they are stuck and described their situation as a “bitter pill.”

    Two Key Studies Show that Strategic Defaults Continue to Grow

    Last year, two important studies were published which have tried to get a handle on strategic defaults. First came an April report by three Morgan Stanley analysts entitled “Understanding Strategic Defaults.”

    The study analyzed 6.5 million anonymous credit reports from TransUnion’s enormous database while focusing on first lien mortgages taken out between 2004 and 2007.

    The authors found that loans originated in 2007 had a significantly higher percentage of strategic defaults than those originated in 2004. The following chart clearly shows this difference.

    chart

    Why are the 2007 borrowers strategically defaulting much more often than the 2004 borrowers? Prices were rising rapidly in 2004 whereas they were falling in nearly all markets by 2007. So the 2007 loans were considerably more underwater than the 2004 loans.

    Note also that the strategic default rate rises very sharply at higher Vantage credit scores. (Vantage scoring was developed jointly by the three credit reporting agencies and now competes with FICO scoring.)

    Another chart shows us that even for loans originated in 2007, the strategic default percentage climbs with higher credit scores.

    chart

    Notice in this chart that although the percentage of all loans which defaulted declines as the Vantage score rises, the percentage of defaults which are strategic actually rises.

    A safe conclusion to draw from these two charts is that homeowners with high credit scores have less to lose by walking away from their mortgage. The provider of these credit scores, VantageScore Solutions, has reported that the credit score of a homeowner who defaults and ends up in foreclosure falls by an average of 21%. This is probably acceptable for a borrower who can pocket perhaps $40,000 to $60,000 or more by stopping the mortgage payment.

    Why Do Homeowners Strategically Default?

    Is there a decisive factor that causes a strategic default? To answer this, we need to turn to the other recent study.

    Last May, a very significant analysis of strategic defaults was published by the Federal Reserve Board. Entitled “The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions,” it was extremely focused in scope. The authors examined 133,000 non-prime first lien purchase mortgages originated in 2006 for single-family properties in the four bubble states where prices collapsed the most — California, Florida, Nevada, and Arizona. All of the mortgages provided 100% financing with no down payment.

    By September 2009, an astounding 80% of all these homeowners had defaulted. Half of these defaults occurred less than 18 months from the origination date. During that time, prices had dropped by roughly 20%. By September 2009 when the study’s observation period ended, median prices had fallen by roughly another 20%.

    This study really zeroes in on the impact which negative equity has on the decision to walk away from the mortgage. Take a look at this first chart which shows strategic default percentages at different stages of being underwater.

    chart
    Source: 2010 FRB study

    Notice that the percentage of defaults which are strategic rises steadily as negative equity increases. For example, with FICO scores between 660 and 720, roughly 45% of defaults are strategic when the mortgage amount is 50% more than the value of the home. When the loan is 70% more than the house’s value, 60% of the defaults were strategic.

    This last chart focuses on the impact which negative equity has on strategic defaults based upon whether or not the homeowner missed any mortgage payments prior to defaulting.

    chart
    Source: 2010 FRB study

    This chart shows what I consider to be the best measure of strategic defaulters. It separates defaulting homeowners by whether or not they missed any mortgage payments prior to defaulting. As I see it, a homeowner who suddenly goes from never missing a mortgage payment to defaulting has made a conscious decision to default.

    The chart reveals that when the mortgage exceeds the home value by 60%, roughly 55% of the defaults are considered to be strategic. For those strategic defaulters who are this far underwater, the benefits of stopping the mortgage payment outweigh the drawbacks (or “costs” as the authors portray it) enough to overcome whatever reservations they might have about walking away.

    Where Do We Go From Here?

    The implications of this FRB report are really grim. Keep in mind that 80% of the 133,000 no-down-payment loans examined had gone into default within three years. Clearly, homeowners with no skin in the game have little incentive to continue paying the loan when the property goes further and further underwater.

    While the bulk of the zero-down-payment first liens originated in 2006 have already gone into default, there are millions of 80/20 piggy-back loans originated in 2004-2006 which have not.

    We know from reports issued by LoanPerformance that roughly 33% of all the Alt A loans securitized in 2004-2006 were 80/20 no-down-payment deals. Also, more than 20% of all the subprime loans in these mortgage-backed security pools had no down payments.

    Here is the most ominous statistic of them all. In my article on the looming home equity line of credit (HELOC) disaster posted here in early September (Home Equity Lines of Credit: The Next Looming Disaster?), I pointed out that there were roughly 13 million HELOCs outstanding. This HELOC madness was concentrated in California where more than 2.3 million were originated in 2005-2006 alone.

    How many of these homes with HELOCs are underwater today? Roughly 98% of them, and maybe more. Equifax reported that in July 2009, the average HELOC balance nationwide for homeowners with prime first mortgages was nearly $125,000. Yet the studies which discuss how many homeowners are underwater have examined only first liens. It’s very difficult to get good data about second liens on a property.

    So if you’ve read that roughly 25% of all homes with a mortgage are now underwater, forget that number. If you include all second liens, It could easily be 50%. This means that in many of those major metros that have experienced the worst price collapse, more than 50% of all mortgaged properties may be seriously underwater.

    The Florida Collapse: Is This Where We Are Heading?

    Nowhere is the impact of the collapse in home prices more evident than in Florida. The three counties with the highest percentage of first liens either seriously delinquent or in pre-foreclosure (default) are all located in Florida. According to CoreLogic, the worst county is Miami-Dade with an incredible 25% of all mortgages in serious distress and headed for either foreclosure or short sale.

    An article posted on the Huffington Post in mid-January 2011 describes the Florida “mortgage meltdown” in grim detail. Written by Floridian Mark Sunshine, it begins by pointing out that 50% of all the residential mortgages currently sitting in private, non-GSE mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were more than 60 days delinquent — either seriously delinquent, in default, bankruptcy, or already foreclosed by the bank. I checked his source — the American Securitization Forum — and the percentage was correct.

    The author then goes on to discuss a strategic default situation among his friends in Florida. One of them had purchased a condo in early 2007 for $300,000. By mid-2010, it had plunged in value to less than $100,000 and he decided to stop paying the mortgage. When he expressed his concerns about the possible consequences to his buddies — including an attorney, an accountant, and a doctor — all expressed the same advice to him. They told him to walk away from the mortgage, save his money, and prepare to move to a rental unit. To them, it seemed like a no-brainer.

    The author was a little surprised that no one thought there was anything wrong with strategically defaulting. The attorney actually suggested that the defaulter file for bankruptcy to prevent the bank from going after a deficiency judgment for the remaining loan balance after the repossessed property was sold.

    The conclusion expressed by the author has far-reaching implications. As he saw it, “More and more Floridians who pay their mortgage feel like chumps compared to defaulters; they turn over their disposable income to the bank and know it will take most of their lifetimes to recover.”

    As prices slide to new lows in metro after metro, will this attitude toward defaulting spread from Florida to more and more of the nation? A May 2010 Money Magazine survey asked readers if they would ever consider walking away from their mortgage. The results were sobering indeed:

    • Never: 42%
    • Only if I had to: 38%
    • Yes: 16%
    • Already have: 4%

    In late January of this year, a report on strategic defaults issued by the Nevada Association of Realtors seemed to confirm the findings of the two studies I’ve discussed. The telephone survey interviewed 1,000 Nevada homeowners. One question asked was this: “Some homeowners in Nevada have chosen to undergo a ‘strategic default’ and stop making mortgage payments despite having the ability to make the payments. Some refer to this as ‘walking away from a mortgage.’ Would you describe your current or recent situation as a ‘strategic default?’”

    Of those surveyed, 23% said they would classify their own situation as a strategic default. Many of those surveyed said that trusted confidants had advised them that strategic default was their best option. One typical response was that the loan “was so upside down it would never have been okay.”

    What seems fairly clear from this Nevada survey and the two reports I’ve reviewed is that as home values continue to decline and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios rise, the number of homeowners choosing to walk away from their mortgage obligation will relentlessly grow. That means growing trouble for nearly all major housing markets around the country.

    This post originally appeared at Minyanville.

    Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/strategic-defaults-revisited-it-could-get-very-ugly-2011-4#ixzz1KnI0npxu

  • Oregon Foreclosures: The Mess That MERS Made, by Phil Querin, Q-Law.com


    For the past several years in Oregon, foreclosures have been processed fraudulently and in violation of Oregon’s trust deed law. Banks, servicers, title companies and licensed foreclosure trustees, were all aware of the problem for years, but no one did anything about it. This was not a minor error or simple oversight – it was a patent disregard for the laws of Oregon.

    Oregon’s Trust Deed Foreclosure Law. It is widely known that during the credit/housing boom, lenders frequently sold their loans between one another. When the ownership of a loan is transferred, it is necessary to execute, in recordable form, an “Assignment of Trust Deed.” ORS 86.735(1) governs what must occur before a trust deed may be foreclosed in Oregon; all such assignments must be placed on the public record. This is not a new law and it is not significantly different from the laws of many other states. Oregon’s law has been on the books for decades.

    ORS 86.735(1) is not complicated or confusing. It simply means that after the original lender makes a loan and takes back a trust deed (which is immediately recorded), all subsequent assignments of that loan must be recorded before the foreclosure is formally commenced. In this manner, one can see from the public record, the “chain of title” of the loan, and thereby know with certainty, that the lender filing the foreclosure actually has the legal right to do so. It protects the consumer and assures the reliability of Oregon land titles.

    The MERS Solution. In the 1990s, MERS came into existence. Its avowed purpose was to replace the time honored system of public recording for mortgage and trust deed transfers, with an electronic registry which its members would voluntarily use when a loan was transferred. This registry is for use only by MERS members, all of whom are in the lending industry. The immediate effect of MERS was that lenders stopped publicly recording their mortgage and trust deed assignments. This deprived local governments of millions of dollars in recording fees, and took the business of the sale of loans “underground.” A more detailed discussion of MERS’ business model is posted here.

    Although the numbers vary, it is believed that MERS comprises approximately 60% of the national lending industry. Until recently, it had no employees. MERS was not born from any state statute or national enabling legislation. It was the brainchild of its owners, Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America, Nationwide, HSBC, American Land Title Association, and Wells Fargo, among others.

    How MERS Has Contributed To Oregon’s Mortgage Mess. In an effort to give MERS the appearance of authority, its rules clarify that it will act solely as a “Nominee” for each of its members – doing only what its member instructs, but in its own name and not the name of the member. The “Nominee” is, as some Oregon federal judges have correctly observed, nothing more than “a strawman.”

    When the foreclosure crisis hit, lenders realized that they needed some way to get the trust deed into current bank’s hands to initiate the process. Since MERS’ existence was virtual, and with no real employees, whenever it came time to assign a mortgage or trust deed, a MERS “Assistant Vice President” or “Assistant Secretary” would execute the assignment on behalf of MERS in their “official” capacity. But since MERS has no such officers, it simply created mass “Corporate Resolutions”, appointing one or more low level member bank employees to “robo-sign” thousands of bogus assignments.

    It is important to note that these MERS “officers” only made one assignment – i.e. from the original lender whose name appeared on the public record when the loan was first made, to the foreclosing lender. In Oregon, this means that ORS 86.735(1) requiring the recording all of the intervening assignments, was intentionally ignored. Hence, there was never a “chain of title” on the public record disclosing the intervening assignments of the loan. As a result, in Oregon, no one – including the homeowner – knows if the bank foreclosing a loan even has a legal right to do so.

    And there is reason to believe many of the banks did not have the legal right to foreclose. In every Oregon foreclosure I have witnessed during the last twelve months, where the loan was securitized into a REMIC, there is substantial doubt that the foreclosing bank, acting as the “trustee” of the securitized loan pool, actually had any right to foreclose. This is due to the strict tax, accounting, and trust laws governing the REMIC securitization process.

    The short explanation is that if the paperwork was actually transferred into a loan pool between, say 2005 – 2008, there would be no need for an assignment to that trustee today – the loan would have already been in the pool and the trustee already had the right to foreclose; but if the loan was not transferred into the pool back then – when it should have been, it cannot be legally assigned out to that trustee today. Although it is not always easy to locate, the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, or “PSA,” governing the REMIC will contain a “Cut-Off Date.” That date is the deadline for the sponsor of the REMIC to identify the pool’s notes and trust deeds (or mortgages) in the trust. After that time [subject to limited exceptions – which do not include the transfer of nonperforming loans into the trust – PCQ], no new loans may be added. For example, if the REMIC was created in early 2006, the Cut-Off Date is likely to also be in 2006. This would mean that a bank, acting in the capacity of a trustee for a certain REMIC today, would not have the legal right to foreclose, if that trustee only recently received the trust deed assignment. The REMIC had been closed years earlier.

    This is fraudulent. Yet it was so widespread, that foreclosures routinely adopted this “single assignment” model, and it became an assembly line business for MERS and its member banks. The assignment documents were typically prepared in advance by foreclosure mill attorneys and foreclosure trustee companies, uploaded into cyberspace to a servicer or foreclosure processing company, and signed, en masse, by robo-signers. Then the assignments were shipped over to notaries, who never actually witnessed the MERS “officer” sign an document. Once completed, the original assignment document was sent via overnight mail to the foreclosure trustee to record and begin the foreclosure. In many instances, the foreclosure trustee, (a) acting as a MERS “officer” would sign the assignment document transferring ownership of the loan to a lender, then (b) he or she would sign another document appointing their company as the Successor Trustee, then (c) that same person would also sign the Notice of Default, which commenced the foreclosure. No conflict of interest there…. It is this “need for speed” that epitomizes the MERS business model.

    The result has been predictable – today there is evidence of fraudulent foreclosure paperwork on a massive scale. Forgeries are rampant. Notarization laws are flaunted. Until recently, the banks and MERS have gotten away with this scheme. The lending, servicing and title industries have simply taken a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to foreclosures in Oregon and elsewhere.

    However, in 2010, Oregon and several other states said “enough.” In Oregon for example, there were at least three federal district court and bankruptcy court cases that struck down foreclosures due to the use of the MERS strawman model, and also based upon the flagrant violation of ORS 86.735(1). The most notable of these cases is the February 7, 2011 published opinion of Hon. Frank R. Alley III, Chief Bankruptcy Judge in Donald McCoy III v. BNC Mortgage, et al. Judge Alley held, in part, that: “…the powers accorded to MERS by the Lender [whose name appears in the Trust Deed] – with the Borrower’s consent – cannot exceed the powers of the beneficiary. The beneficiary’s right to require a non-judicial sale is limited by ORS 86.735. A non-judicial sale may take place only if any assignment by [the Lender whose name appears in the Trust Deed] has been recorded.” [Parentheticals mine. PCQ]

    Judge Alley concluded that a failure to follow the successive recording requirement of ORS 86.735(1) meant that the foreclosure was void. It is important to note that in McCoy, as in most rulings against MERS lenders, the courts have not held that the banks may not prosecute their foreclosures – merely that before doing so, they must record all intervening assignments, so there is no question as to the foreclosing bank’s standing.

    MERS is now engaged, through surrogates and one or more lobbyists, to introduce a bill in the Oregon legislature. It is a bold effort to legislatively overturn Judge Alley’s ruling, as well as similar adverse rulings by Oregon federal court judges, King, Hogan, and Perris.

    MERS, its member banks, and the foreclosure industry, including its foreclosure mill attorneys, have never had justification for ignoring Oregon’s foreclosure law. Nor have they offered any justification. Instead, they have threatened that if ORS 86.735(1) and other homeowner protections in our foreclosure statutes are not amended to give MERS the right to continue acting as a strawman, and to avoid recording all successive assignments, the Oregon housing and foreclosure crisis will continue longer than necessary. Metaphorically speaking, having been caught with their hand in the cookie jar, MERS now asks the Oregon Legislature to legalize cookie theft.

    Oregon Consumers Need To Be Protected. MERS’ proposed legislative solution does nothing to protect homeowners. Rather, it is aimed at legalizing patently fraudulent conduct, in the name of “helping” Oregon homeowners get through the foreclosure crisis faster. Thanks, but no thanks. The title and lending industry are concerned that if a law is not immediately passed giving MERS its way, foreclosures will come to a halt and commerce will suffer. The banks have even threatened to file judicial foreclosures against homeowners, to somehow avoid the recording of assignments law. This is a complete ruse. Here’s why:

    Lenders cannot avoid their paperwork problems in Oregon by going into court. As we have seen in Oregon’s federal court cases, the banks are still unwilling to produce the necessary documents to prove they have standing to foreclose. If a bank does not have the legal documentation minimally necessary to establish its right to foreclose non-judicially, why would it go into court and shine a bright light on its own fraudulent paperwork? The outcome will be the same – as we have seen in judicial foreclosure states such as Florida, where they now require the banks’ attorneys to certify to the truthfulness of their pleadings and paperwork.
    Lenders will not go into court for fear of further alienating an already alienated public. [Note the recent MERS Announcement to it’s members, tightening is rules due to concern over its “…reputation, legal and compliance risk….” – PCQ]
    The banks know that with the high court filing fees and lawyers, it will be much more costly for them to foreclose judicially in court. While they do not seem concerned about their high executive bonuses, when it comes to the cost of foreclosures, they’ll pinch a penny ’til it screams.
    In any event, there is little reason to fear judicial foreclosures clogging court dockets. With proper documentation, the process can be relatively fast (3+ months), since the cases could be disposed of on summary judgment. If judicial foreclosure cases became too numerous, the local courts can create expedited protocols and assign certain judges to speed them through – as done in other states. Lastly, many foreclosures are already being filed judicially, especially on commercial properties. To date, there has been no hue and cry that it is overwhelming the court systems.
    The lenders’ complaints that foreclosures are slowing Oregon’s housing recovery are not necessarily verified by the stats. Oregon’s Regional Multiple Listing Service (“RMLS™”) shows that January 2009 housing inventory (i.e. dividing active listings by closed sales) was 19.2 months; January 2010 was 12.6 months; January 2011 was 11.3 months. February 2009 was 16.6 months, February 2010 was 12.9 months; and February 2011 was 10.9 months. March 2010 showed housing inventory at 7.8 months (down from 12.0 months in 2009), and there is no reason we cannot expect even better numbers when this month is over.

    These numbers suggest that housing inventory is gradually being reduced year over year. Although it is true that housing prices continue to decline, that is more likely the result of lenders fire-selling their own REO inventory, than anything else. I say this because of many anecdotal reports of lenders refusing short sales at prices higher than they ultimately sold following foreclosure. Perhaps lender logic is different than human logic….

    In an online article in Mortgage News Daily [a lender resource site – just look at their advertising – PCQ], it was reported:

    The cost of a foreclosure, it turns out, is pretty staggering and we wonder why lenders and the investors they represent aren’t jumping at a solution, any solution, that would allow them to avoid going to foreclosure whenever possible.***According the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, the average foreclosure costs were $77,935 while preventing a foreclosure runs $3,300.

    Overall, foreclosure is a lose-lose proposition for all concerned – except perhaps the companies servicing and foreclosing the loans [Point of Interest: Bank of America owns BAC Servicing and ReconTrust, and is making millions from the business of servicing and foreclosing the loans it made to its own borrowers. A sterling example of vertical integration in a down market… PCQ]

    The only good solution is a non-foreclosure solution. Lenders already have ultimate control over the outcome for every loan in default. In those cases where modifications are viable, they should do so on an expedited basis. [Point of Interest: Go to the following CoreLogic site here , where in 2010 they touted their new analytics program that is designed to enhance lender decision making on modifications, short sales, and deeds-in-lieu. One has to believe that if such programs exist and banks stopped losing borrowers’ paperwork, they could actually have a decision back fairly quickly – rather than the 14-month horror stories we hear about. – PCQ]

    Although it is doubtful that the industry can and will – anytime soon – create a fast and fair process to reduce principal balances, that is certainly a fair solution. It is fair to the homeowner in need, and actually fair to the bank, since the cost of foreclosure, including taxes, insurance, commissions, and other carrying costs, are significantly more than the short term pain of a write down. [If the banks need a little accounting sleight-of-hand from the FASB, there’s no reason they couldn’t put some pressure on, as they did with the mark-to-market rules. -PCQ]

    Another, more likely and quicker solution, is to establish a fast-track short sale process. This should not be complicated if the banks stopped “losing paperwork” and focused on turning short sales into 45-60 day closings, consistent with the timing for equity sales. It has been lender delays that have stigmatized short sales, so only hungry investors, and buyers with the patience of Job, participate. This can change if banks begin expediting their short sale processing.

    With both the modification and short sale alternatives, lenders do not receive the property back into their already bloated REO departments; and there is the added advantage that the banks do not have to risk a judicial slapdown, when using their fraudulently prepared Assignments of Trust Deed. In short, it is a “win-win” solution for lender and borrower.

    Conclusion. The MERS business model was based upon the concept that “It is better to seek forgiveness than permission.” The problems they created were done with their eyes wide open in a brazen act of “might makes right” hubris. After having created these problems, they are now seeking to legislatively overturn the rulings of several of Oregon’s highly regarded federal judges. These decisions have affirmed the rule of law. To do otherwise – that is to sanctify MERS’ illegal conduct by eviscerating statues designed to protect homeowners, would be a travesty.

    MERS, the banks, and the title industry own this problem, and they should own the solution. Whatever the outcome, it must be fair, and should not be borne on the backs of Oregon’s already struggling homeowners.

  • Mortgage Apps Rise as FHA Loan Demand Surges, Thetruthaboutmortgage.com


    Mortgage application volume increased 5.3 percent on a seasonally adjusted basis during the week ending April 15 as government mortgage demand surged, the Mortgage Bankers Association reported today.

    The refinance index increased a meager 2.7 percent from the previous week, but purchase money mortgages jumped 10.0 percent, mostly due to a 17.6 percent spike in FHA loan lending.

    “Purchase application volume jumped last week largely due to another sharp increase in applications for government loans. Borrowers were likely motivated to apply for loans before the scheduled increase in FHA insurance premiums,” said Michael Fratantoni, MBA’s Vice President of Research and Economics, in a release.

    Refinance activity increased somewhat, as rates dropped to their lowest level in a month towards the end of the week.”

    That pushed the refinance share of mortgage activity to 58.5 percent of total applications from 60.3 percent a week earlier.

    So it looks as if purchases will eclipse refinances in the near future, which is good news for the flagging housing market.

    Meanwhile, the popular 30-year fixed-rate mortgage dipped to 4.83 percent from 4.98 percent, keeping the hope of refinancing alive for more borrowers.

    The 15-year fixed averaged 4.07 percent, down from 4.17 percent a week earlier, meaning mortgage rates are still very, very low historically.

    That alone could bring more buyers to the signing table this summer.

  • Proposed QRM Rule Released, 20% Down Payment Required, by Michael Kraus, Totalmortgage.com


    New proposed risk-retention rules, required as part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform were released today by the FDIC, according to a report from Fox News.

    The new regulations would require mortgage originators to retain capital reserves equal to 5% of all but the safest mortgages. The mortgages that are exempt from the risk retention guidelines are termed “qualified residential mortgages” or QRMs. In order to qualify as a QRM, there must be a down payment of at least 20%. Additionally, anyone who has ever had a 60 day delinquency in their credit history will not qualify for a QRM. FHA loans will be exempt from the QRM rules, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages may also be exempt so long as these agencies are in government conservatorship.

    As we’ve discussed in the past, there could be a number of side effects for borrowers, among them increased mortgage rates for anyone who doesn’t qualify for a QRM. Another one of the side effects could be that the FHA Mortgage Share could increase significantly as these loans are exempt from the QRM rule.

    Sheila Bair, Chairman of the FDIC, spoke at an FDIC board meeting today and addressed the proposed rule. She said:

    “In thinking about the impact of this proposed rule, we need to keep in mind the following facts:
    First, the QRM requirements will not define the entire mortgage market, but only that segment that is exempt from risk retention. Lenders can – and will – find ways to provide credit on more flexible terms, but only if they then comply with the risk retention rules.
    Second, what matters to underserved borrowers is not just the volume of credit that is available, but also the quality of that credit. More than half of the subprime loans made in 2006 and 2007 that were securitized ended up in default, which hurt both borrowers and investors and triggered the financial crisis. By aligning the interests of borrowers, securitizers and investors, our new rules will help to avoid these outcomes and keep default rates at much lower levels. They will also help avoid another securitization-fed housing bubble which made home prices unaffordable for many LMI borrowers.
    Finally, the private securitization market, which created more than $1 trillion in mortgage credit annually in its peak years of 2005 and 2006, has virtually ceased to exist in the wake of the crisis. Issuance in 2009 and 2010 was just 5 percent of peak levels. This market needs strong rules that assure investors that the process is not rigged against them. The intent of this rulemaking is not to kill private mortgage securitization – the financial crisis has already done that. Our intent is to restore sound practices in lending, securitization and loan servicing, and bring this market back better than before.”
    The majority of homeowners with mortgages in this country would be unable to refinance into a QRM due to a lack of home equity. Additionally, the vast number of people who have gone through foreclosure or have even been two months delinquent would be unable to get a QRM. All of these people will likely pay increased mortgage rates if they were to refinance or get a new mortgage. I totally understand the reasoning behind the QRM. It also strikes me as being a classic case of closing the barn door after the horse has escaped. What are your thoughts on the proposed rule? Let me know in the comments section below.